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Logics of knowledge have been shown to provide a useful approach to
the high level specification and analysis of distributed systems. It has
been proposed that such systems can be developed using knowledge-
based protocols, in which agents’ actions have preconditions that test their
state of knowledge. Both computer-assisted analysis of the knowledge
properties of systems and automated compilation of knowledge-based
protocols require the development of algorithms for the computation of
states of knowledge. This paper studies one of the computational problems
of interest, the model checking problem for knowledge formulae in the S5n
Kripke structures generated by finite state environments in which states
determine an observation for each agent. Agents are assumed to have per-
fect recall and may operate synchronously or asynchronously. It is shown
that, in this setting, model checking of common knowledge formulae is
intractable, but efficient incremental algorithms are developed for formulae
containing only knowledge operators. Connections to knowledge updates
and compilation of knowledge-based protocols are discussed. ] 1998
Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been considerable activity in the application of logics of
knowledge to distributed and multi-agent systems. Work in this area has dealt
primarily with semantic issues (Chandy and Misra, 1986; Fagin et al., 1991; Halpern
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and Moses, 1990; Halpern and Vardi, 1989; Panangaden and Taylor, 1992), the
development of logics and decision procedures for their validity problem (Fisher
and Immerman, 1986; Halpern and Moses, 1992; Halpern and Vardi, 1988a;
Halpern and Vardi, 1988b; Ladner and Reif, 1986; Parikh and Ramanujam, 1985),
and the use of modal languages with knowledge operators to analyze specific coor-
dination tasks (Dwork and Moses, 1990; Hadzilacos, 1987; Halpern, 1987; Halpern
and Zuck, 1992; Mazer, 1988). It has been argued that the notion of knowledge
provides a natural level of abstraction at which to reason about distributed systems.
This suggests that it may be worthwhile to consider the construction of
automated tools that support the analysis and verification of distributed systems in
terms of knowledge, e.g., Rosenschein and Kaelbling(1986). It has also been
proposed that there should be knowledge-based programming languages, containing
primitive constructs at the knowledge level (Fagin et al., 1995a; Moses and Kislev,
1993; Shoham, 1993). Both applications require answers to the following question:
given a description of a distributed system, how do we efficiently compute the
answer to a query about the knowledge of the agents (processors) in a given state?
Closely related is the question of update: how should an agent maintain its
knowledge of the world, and its knowledge of other agents’ knowledge, so that it
may efficiently determine whether it knows a particular fact.
In this paper we investigate these questions for a very simple abstract framework.
We suppose that some fixed number of agents inhabit an environment with a finite
number of possible states. In each state of the environment every agent makes an
observation, which will in general be insufficient to determine that state. The evolu-
tion of the state is constrained by a transition diagram, which determines the traces
of the system, i.e., the possible sequences of states. We suppose that both the transi-
tion diagram and the relationship between states and the agents’ observations are
common knowledge to all agents.
Though simple, this framework is sufficiently rich to represent many systems of
interest, including finite state shared variable systems, and message passing systems
with bounded buffers. Both synchronous and asynchronous systems of these kinds
fall within its scope. The framework is also able to represent most games of imper-
fect information, including bridge, poker, Battleships, Stratego, and Kriegspiel.
Since the observations do not determine the state, agents, in general, have only
incomplete information about the current state. However, an agent potentially
knows more than it learns from its most recent observation. Using its knowledge
of the possible state transitions, an agent can derive from its knowledge about prior
states of the world additional information about the current state, including addi-
tional information about other agents’ knowledge. For example, suppose I have
learned from an accomplice that my opponent in a poker game holds exactly one
ace. If I observe him discard one card, receiving another in its place, then even
though I cannot directly observe his current hand, I may use my knowledge of his
previous hand to infer that he now holds at most two aces. The same sort of
reasoning applies to knowledge about knowledge. If my opponent knew that I
knew he had one ace (my accomplice is a double agent) then he knows that I now
know he has at most two aces. Indeed, if it is common knowledge that I cheated,
then the fact that my opponent has at most two aces is also common knowledge.
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To formalize this sort of reasoning, we need to ascribe a precise state of
knowledge to the agents. There are a number of natural ways to do this. Following
the usual definitions of knowledge in distributed systems (Fagin et al., 1995b), in
each global state of the system we are required to assign to each agent a local state.
An agent i may then be said to know a fact . at a global state in which the agent
is in local state s just when . is true in all global states where agent i is in local
state s. Intuitively, an agent’s local state encodes the information it has about the
global state.
In our framework, an agent’s local state is determined by its observations. In
order to exploit prior knowledge in reasoning about the current global state, an
agent needs to recall information obtained from its previous observations. We
assume the strongest possible model of memory, namely that agents have perfect
recall of all their observations. The perfect recall assumption is one that has fre-
quently been made in the literature. Since it implies optimal use of information,
perfect recall is the appropriate assumption to make in proving impossibility results
and lower bounds on communication (Halpern and Moses, 1990; Chandy and
Misra, 1986). Perfect recall is also a convenient working assumption during the
design of a protocol, that enables the definition of data structures to be deferred.
Once it has been determined what information processors require, optimal data
structures may be designed that encode just this relevant information (Dwork and
Moses, 1990; Moses and Tuttle, 1988).
The perfect recall assumption, however, still leaves two possible ascriptions of
local state, depending on whether the agents operate synchronously (i.e., with a
global clock visible to all agents) or asynchronously. We study both cases. In the
synchronous case we assign to an agent the sequence of its observations in all pre-
vious states. In the asynchronous case agents are not assumed to know the length
of time for which they were making an observation, so we assign to an agent its
sequence of observations with consecutive repetitions deleted.
We obtain from each of these local state ascriptions an S5n Kripke structure, a
semantic structure which may be used to interpret languages with knowledge
operators. The propositional modal language we consider in this paper contains an
operator for the knowledge of each agent, as well as an operator for the common
knowledge of each group of agents. The basic propositions describe the current
state of the world. Thus the sentences of this language refer only to the current state
and to the mutual knowledge that agents have about the current state.
The problem we are interested in, then, is how to efficiently compute whether a
given formula holds at a given world in the Kripke structure generated by an
environment. The question of how to evaluate modal formulae in a Kripke struc-
ture is the model checking problem. Model checking knowledge formulae in finite
Kripke S5n structures is known to be in polynomial time (Halpern and Moses,
1992). Unfortunately, this result is not directly applicable to our problem, since the
structures we consider may have an infinite number of worlds.
However, it would appear at first blush that this complexity can be overcome.
The local state assignment is a semantic device for the external ascription of a state
of knowledge to an agent. We do not assume that an agent actually maintains its
sequence of observations: any data structure with the same informational content
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(with respect to the formulae of interest) is a permitted knowledge representation.
Given that there exist only a finite number of states of the environment and that
our formulae refer only to the current state, and to agents’ mutual knowledge of the
current state, it is reasonable to expect that the number of different states of
knowledge an agent may attain in a given environment is also finite. A surprisingly
simple example presented in Section 2 shows that this is not the case. The states of
knowledge attained by agents may require arbitrarily deep nestings of modal
operators to describe.
This suggests that the complexity of model checking knowledge formulae may be
high. Indeed, we show in Section 5 that for formulae involving common knowledge,
the model checking problem in our framework is PSPACE complete in the syn-
chronous case and undecidable in the asynchronous case. These results hold even
for a fixed formula.
On the other hand, model checking formulae not involving common knowledge
turns out to be less complex. The reason for this is related to a slightly different
perspective on our problem. Consider the point of view of an agent. As each new
observation is made, the agent is interested in answering the question ‘‘Given what
I have just seen, and all that I knew before, what do I know now?’’ That is,
the agent is required to update its previous knowledge to reflect the new infor-
mation.
Given some reasonable constraints on formulae, it turns out that a data structure
more succinct than the agent’s sequence of observations suffices as a knowledge
representation. We show in Section 4 that provided the formulae we wish to check
contain no occurrences of common knowledge operators, and k or fewer alterna-
tions of knowledge operators, there exists a knowledge representation, called
k-trees, that may be updated in constant time and queried in time linear in the size
of the formula. This yields an incremental algorithm for model checking. Such an
incremental algorithm exists for both the synchronous semantics and the
asynchronous semantics. In particular, it is shown that fixed formulae not involving
common knowledge correspond to regular sets of traces, so that model checking
may be implemented by means of finite state automata in this case.
These results contribute to the goal of providing automated support for
knowledge-theoretic analysis of distributed systems by beginning to delineate the
feasible from the infeasible problems in this methodology. In particular, the results
of Section 4 show that for bounded alternation depth formulae, it is possible to
finitely represent and compute states of knowledge with respect to the perfect recall
semantics. These results may be applied to show that certain problems concerning
the verification of knowledge-based programs are, in principle, feasible, as is dis-
cussed in Section 6.
The knowledge representation, k-trees, used in the results of Section 4, may be of
independent interest. Our use of such structures is somewhat different from the
approach usually taken in the literature on knowledge base updates (Katsuno and
Mendelzon, 1991), in which it is assumed that agents maintain their knowledge as
a set of sentences of some language. Our methods are more closely related to the
model checking approach to reasoning about knowledge advocated in (Halpern
and Vardi, 1991).
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls the standard semantics
of knowledge, introduces our formal model of distributed environments, and defines
the problems we study in this paper. Section 3 establishes an upper bound for model
checking common knowledge formulae in synchronous environments. Section 4
deals with bounded alternation depth formulae, showing that there exists an efficient
incremental approach to model checking such formulae in both synchronous and
asynchronous environments. Section 5 concerns lower bounds for model checking
common knowledge formulae in the synchronous and the asynchronous cases. The
relation of our work to compilation of knowledge-based programming languages is
discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2. DEFINITIONS
In this section we describe the formal model of distributed systems and the
ascription of states of knowledge to agents. We begin in Section 2.1 by recalling the
general semantics of knowledge using Kripke structures as well as a number of
standard constructions on such structures. In Section 2.2 we define finite state
environments and give two ways of associating a Kripke structure with an environ-
ment. In Section 2.3 we define the main problem studied in this paper, the model
checking problem in these Kripke structures, and describe a number of ways of
measuring its complexity.
2.1. Kripke Structures
We will deal with queries about knowledge expressed in the propositional modal
language LCn which has a modal operator Ki for each agent i=1 } } } n, as well as
a modal operator CG for each set G of two or more agents (Halpern and Moses,
1992). Intuitively, the operator Ki refers to the knowledge of agent i, and the
operator CG refers to the common knowledge of the group G. More precisely, the
formulae of LCn are defined as follows:
1. Each propositional constant p in Prop is a formula.
2. If . and  are formulae then c. and . 7  are formulae.
3. If . is a formula then Ki . is a formula, for each i=1 } } } n.
4. If . is a formula then CG. is a formula, for each subset G of [1 } } } n] of
cardinality two or more.
The sublanguage Ln consists of the formulae of L
C
n which do not contain the
operators CG . Define the alternation depth of a formula in Ln to be the number of
alternations of distinct knowledge operators in the formula. For example, p is a
formula of alternation depth 0 and K2 K1 K1 K2 q has alternation depth 3.
The language LCn is interpreted in the following class of models. A Kripke
structure for n agents is a tuple
M=(W, K1 , ..., Kn , V),
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where W is a set of worlds, Ki is a binary relation on W for each i, and
V : W_Prop  [0, 1] is a valuation. If all the relations Ki are equivalence relations
then we say that M is an S5n structure. Most of the Kripke structures we deal with
in this paper will be S5n structures. The semantics of L
C
n is given as usual, the only
nonstandard point being the truth definition for the common knowledge operator.
If G is a set of agents then we say a world u is G-accessible from a world w if there
exists a sequence of worlds u0 , u1 , ..., un such that uo=w, un=u and for all
i=0 } } } n&1 there exists an agent j # G such that ui Kj ui+1 . The following clauses
give an inductive definition of the relation M, w < ., representing that formula .
is true at world w in the Kripke structure M:
1. For propositional constants p # Prop, M, w < p if V(w, p)=1.
2. M, w < .1 7 .2 if M, w < .1 and M, w < .2 .
3. M, w < c.1 if not M, w < .1 .
4. M, w < Ki. if M, u < . for all worlds u such that wKiu.
5. M, w < CG . if M, u < . for all worlds u which are G-accessible from w.
Note that if M is an S5n structure and G=[i] is a singleton set then u is
G-accessible from w just when wKiu. Thus, in this case the semantics of CG
collapses to the semantics of Ki , which is why we assumed above that G contains
at least two agents.
The problems we will be concerned with in this paper involve what is known as
the model checking problem: how to determine whether a formula . holds at a given
world w in a Kripke structure M. The following result describes the complexity of
this problem when M is a finite Kripke structure. In this case we write &M& for the
sum of the number of worlds in M and the number of tuples in the relations Ki .
Proposition 2.1. If M is a finite S5n structure and . # LCn then M, w < . can
be decided in time O( |.| } &M&).
Proof. For . # Ln it is shown in Halpern and Moses (1992) how to compute,
in time O( |.| } &M&), for all the worlds of M the truth values of all subformulae of
.. To extend this algorithm to LCn , we show how to compute at all worlds of M,
in time O(&M&), the truth value of the proposition CG ., assuming that the truth
value of . has already been computed at all worlds. First, label all worlds at which
c. holds with cCG .. Next, repeat the following operation until a fixpoint is
reached: if a world u is labelled cCG . and uti v for some i # G then label v with
cCG .. Once the fixpoint is reached, label with CG . all the worlds not already
labeled with cCG .. It is straightforward to check that this procedure can be
implemented in time O(&M&) and terminates with the property that each world w
is labeled CG . if and only if M, w < CG.. K
We now review a known result that enables the complexity of model checking to
be optimized. It is clear from the truth definition that only worlds [1, ..., n]-
accessible from w influence the truth of formulae at the world w. More formally,
define the submodel generated by a world w to be the structure M$=(W$, K$1 , ...,
K$n , V$) with W$ equal to the set of worlds [1, ..., n]-accessible from w, and the
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K$i and V$ the restrictions of the respective components of M to the set W$. Then
we have the following straightforward generalization of Segerberg’s ‘‘Generation
Theorem’’ (Chellas, 1980):
Lemma 2.2. If . is a formula of LCn and M$ is the submodel of M generated by
the world w then M, w < . if and only if M$, w < ..
2.2 Environments
We now define environments, our formal model of distributed systems, and
describe two ways in which an environment generates a Kripke structure for the
interpretation of the agents’ knowledge, depending on whether agents are taken to
run synchronously or asynchronously.
We wish to model distributed systems in which each state determines an observa-
tion for each agent. Suppose that Prop is some set of propositional constants, and
that O is a set of observations. An environment for n agents with observations O is
a tuple E=(S, I, T, O1 , ..., On , V) such that
1. S is a set of states,
2. I is a subset of S,
3. T is a binary relation on S,
4. Oi is a function from S to O, for each i=1 } } } n, and
5. V is a valuation on S, i.e., a mapping from S_Prop to [0, 1].
An environment is finite-state if the set S is finite. We consider only finite state
environments in this paper.
Intuitively, the elements of S represent the possible global states of the system
being modeled and may encode information such as the control state of com-
ponents of the system, the values of variables maintained by the agents (either
shared or local), messages in transit, etc. The set I represents the initial states of
the environment. We say that T is the transition relation of the environment E,
representing the possible state evolutions. In general, state transitions will be non-
deterministic, i.e., for a given state s there may be many states t such that sTt.
The functions Oi are called the observation functions of E. If s # S is a state, the
value Oi (s) intuitively represents the information that agent i is able to obtain in
state s by direct observation of the environment and its own current local state. The
observation functions induce an equivalence relation Ri on the set of states defined
by sRi s$ when Oi (s)=Oi (s$). Intuitively, two states are equivalent with respect to
Ri when agent i is unable to distinguish these states by immediate observation. The
actual values of the observation functions will play no essential role in our
framework, so we could equivalently have defined environments using the equiv-
alence relations Ri instead of the functions Oi . We will sometimes use this fact when
presenting examples of environments.
Example 2.3. Suppose agent 1 wishes to send a message to agent 2, in a system
which guarantees that the message will be delivered either immediately, or with a
delay of one time step. As agent 1 sends the message, it makes a permanent record
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of the fact that the message has been sent. Similarly, once the message has arrived,
agent 1 makes a record of this fact, which it is able to access at all times thereafter.
We may represent this situation as an environment E as follows. Take the set of
states to be S=[a, b, c], where the state a represents that the message has not yet
been sent by agent 1, the state b represents that the message is in transit, and the
state c represents that the message has been received by agent 2. The set of initial
states I of the environment consists of the state a only. The transition relation T is
the set of tuples [(a, a) , (a, b) , (a, c) , (b, c) , (c, c)].
For the set of observations we choose O=[sent, unsent, rcvd, unrcvd ], representing
the values of the variables maintained by the two agents. Thus, the observa-
tion functions are given by O1(a)=unsent, O1(b)=O1(c)=sent for agent 1 and
O2(a)=O2(b)=unrcvd, O2(c)=rcvd for agent 2. Taking Prop=[ p] to consist of a
single proposition representing that the message has been received, we get the
valuation V with V(x, p)=1 if and only if x=c. The environment E is represented
in Fig. 1, where the arrows indicate transitions, and the ovals represent the equiv-
alence classes associated with the observation relations.
Environments may also be used to represent games of incomplete information,
such as bridge, poker, Battleships, and Kriegspiel. In this case, the states represent
the possible game positions that may be reached during play, the transition relation
captures the legal moves, and the observation functions model the aspects of the
position visible to the players. For example, in card games each player typically
observes only their own hand and the cards that have been revealed by other
players.
Suppose E=(S, I, T, O1 , ..., On , V) is an environment. A trace of the environ-
ment E is a finite sequence of states s1 s2 } } } sm such that s1 # I and sj Tsj+1 for each
j=1 } } } m&1. We write traces(E ) for the set of traces of E. Note that if T contains
a cycle, the set of traces is infinite. If T is serial, then every trace is the prefix of
some strictly longer trace. In other words, no trace terminates. Environments with
arbitrarily long traces will be of greatest interest to us. We adopt the following
FIG. 1. An environment.
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notational convention: constants s, t, ... will always denote states; traces will be
denoted by r, r$, r1 , ... . If r is a trace we write fin(r) for the final state of r.
Intuitively, a trace represents a possible history of the system, and the final state of
a trace represents the ‘‘current’’ state.
We are now ready to describe the Kripke structure associated with an environ-
ment in order to assign states of knowledge to the agents. Our definitions will be
essentially a special case of the framework introduced in (Halpern and Moses,
1990), modulo some minor differences that are discussed in Appendix A. We
consider in this paper two distinct ways to associate a Kripke structure with an
environment, depending on whether agents operate synchronously or asyn-
chronously. In both cases, agents will have perfect recall. (See Fagin et al. (1995b)
for a more extensive motivation of these concepts.) We treat the synchronous case
first.
For each agent i we define an equivalence relation on the traces of an environ-
ment E. The synchronous local state of agent i in a trace r=s1s2 } } } sm of an
environment E is the sequence [r]i=Oi (s1) Oi (s2) } } } Oi (sm). That is, the local
state of an agent is the sequence of observations made by the agent in the trace. We
say two traces r and r$ are indistinguishable to agent i, and write rti r$, if [r]i=
[r$]i . That is, two traces r=s1s2 } } } sm and r$=s$1s$2 } } } s$m$ are indistinguishable to
i if m=m$ and for each l=1 } } } m we have Oi (sl)=Oi (s$l).
Informally, what agent i knows in a given trace is which equivalence class of ti
contains the actual trace. Note that it is implicit in these definitions that an agent
is able to ‘‘tell the time,’’ since the number of states in the trace is equal to the num-
ber of observations in the local state. Further, each distinct observation made by
an agent is reflected in its local state. Thus, we may say these definitions charac-
terize agents operating synchronously and with perfect recall. However, note that we
do not assume that agents necessarily maintain their entire sequence of observa-
tions: the local state assignment is merely a semantic device for describing the
agents’ informational state.
We may now define for each environment E for n agents the Kripke structure
ME=(WE , K1 , ..., Kn , VE) used to interpret the language LCn in the environment
E. This structure has worlds WE=traces(E ), accessibility relations Ki=ti for
i=1 } } } n, and valuation VE : WE_Prop  [0, 1] given by VE (r, p)=V( fin(r), p).
It is clear that ME is an S5n structure. If r is a trace then we will write (E, r) < .
instead of ME , r < .. Note that for propositional constants p, the relation
(E, r) < p depends only on the the final state of r. It follows from this that all for-
mulae of LCn describe the final state, and the agents’ mutual knowledge of the final
state. However, as Example 2.3 shows, environments may be constructed so that
the final state encodes a limited amount of information about the past.
Example 2.4. Consider the environment E for two agents of Example 2.3. The
traces of this environment are strings of the form akblcm, where k1 and 0l1
and m0 are natural numbers. Suppose r=akblcm and r$=ak$bl $cm$ are traces of
the same length. Note that O2(c)=O2(x) if and only if x=c. Hence if rt2 r$ then
m=m$, and we find that there are at most two traces r$ such that rt2 r$, namely
those with k$=k+l&l $, where l $ is either 0 or 1. (One of these traces is just r
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itself.) A similar argument shows that there exist at most two traces r$ such that
rt1 r$. Thus, the component generated by the traces of length n of the Kripke
structure ME is described by the sequence
acn&1t1 abcn&2t2 a2cn&2t1 } } } t2 an&1ct1 an&1bt2 an
where we have omitted the relations holding between each trace and itself. It
follows that (E, acn&1) < (K2 K1) j p holds for all j<n&1, but not for jn&1. In
particular, we see that even if the message is delivered immediately, the fact of its
delivery never becomes common knowledge.1
We now define a second semantics for knowledge in environments, in which we
do not assume that agents are synchronized. What varies in this second semantics
is the definition of agents’ local states. Instead of assuming that an agent is aware
of every transition made, we assume that an agent notices transitions only when
these lead to changes in its observation.
More formally, define [r]ai , agent i ’s asynchronous local state in the trace r, to
be the sequence of distinct observations of agent i. That is, if r is a trace consisting
of a single state s then we define [r]ai =Oi (s), and for traces of the form rs we
define
[rs]ai =[r]
a
i when Oi (s)=Oi ( fin(r))
[rs]ai =[r]
a
i Oi (s) when Oi (s){Oi ( fin(r)).
Using this function, define two traces r, r$ to be asynchronously indistinguishable to
agent i, written rri r$, if [r]ai =[r$]ai . Notice that the agent still has perfect recall
under this definition, but it is no longer assumed to be able to keep track of time.
We write M aE for the Kripke structure obtained from an environment E by replac-
ing the relations ti in ME by the relations ri . We write (Ea, r) < . when the
formula . holds at trace r in M aE .
Example 2.5. We reinterpret the environment of Example 2.3 with respect to
the asynchronous semantics. Consider first the asynchronous indistinguishability
relation r1 for agent 1. If r is a trace of the form ak, then [r]a1=unsent. For all
other traces r, of the form akblcm with k1, 0l1 and l+m1, we have [r]a1=
unsent } sent. Thus, there are precisely two equivalence classes of traces with respect
to the relation r1 . Similarly, it may be shown that the relation r2 partitions the
set of traces into precisely two classes: the traces of the form akbl and the traces of
the form akblcm with m1. Note that none of these equivalence classes contains a
trace akblcm with l>1: although the agents are unable to tell the time, they still
know that the message is delayed by at most one time step.
We showed in Example 2.4 that in the synchronous case, the agents may acquire,
with time, increasing levels of mutual knowledge about the proposition p: ‘‘The
message has been delivered.’’ In contrast, in the asynchronous interpretation, the
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formula C[1, 2] cK1 p is true in all traces: it is always common knowledge that
agent 1 does not know the message has been delivered.
2.3. Problems Studied
We can now give a precise statement of the problems we study in this paper. At
the most general level, we consider the model checking problem in the structures
ME and M aE . That is, the problem of deciding whether (E, r) < . or (E
a, r) < .
hold, given a finite environment E, a trace r of E, and a formula . in LCn . We seek
efficient algorithms for these decision problems, or a classification of their com-
plexity if intractable.
Since the number of traces of an environment may be infinite, Proposition 2.1
does not directly apply to model checking in the structures ME and M aE . Indeed,
it is not even immediately apparent that the model checking problem in these
structures is decidable. In the next section we will establish decidability in the
synchronous case. The story is a little more complex in the asynchronous case.
For formulae involving common knowledge, the problem turns out to be
undecidable in this casethis will be shown in Section 5. However, as will be
shown in Section 4.3, it is decidable for formulae in Ln.
A variety of restrictions of these problems are of interest, as are a number of ways
of measuring their complexity. At the most general level, one can measure the com-
plexity of model checking when all three of the parameters E, r, and . are varied,
with domain the set of all possible finite environments, traces, and formulae in LCn ,
respectively. This also gives an upper bound on the complexity of all restrictions of
the model checking problem.
The main motivation for the study of restricted versions of the model checking
problem arises from the problem of implementing knowledge-based programs
(Fagin et al., 1995a). We will discuss the relation of the knowledge-based program
implementation problem to the model checking problem at greater length in
Section 6. For our present purposes, it suffices to note that in knowledge-based
programs, an agent must compute at each step of its operation the answer to a
given set of queries concerning its knowledge, in order to determine its next action.
This motivates three changes of perspective on the general model checking problem.
First, the formulae relevant to an implementation of a knowledge-based program
are not all possible formulae in LCn , just those that actually occur in the agents’
programs. In case of agent i ’s program, these queries can be assumed to be of the
form Ki . for some . # LCn . Thus, we are led to the investigation of the model
checking problem for restricted sets 8 of queries of this form.
A second restriction of the general model checking problem concerns the presen-
tation of the input. The model checking problem is stated above from the point of
view of an external observer of the system, since it assumes complete information
about the trace. However, one can also pose the model checking problem from the
point of view of the agents: how can an agent compute the answer to a query about
its knowledge, given the information to which it is exposed over a given trace? To
formalize this question, observe first that the truth value of the assertion
(E, r) < Ki . depends only upon the local state [r]i , rather than upon the trace r
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as a whole. Thus one can study the agent-centric problem of deciding (E, r) < Ki .
for formulae . # 8, given [r]i for some trace r of E. Similarly, in the asynchronous
case we have the problem of deciding (Ea, r) < Ki . for formulae . # 8 given [r]ai
for some trace r of E.
The final modification to the general model checking problem motivated by the
relation to knowledge-based programs concerns the structure of the model checking
computation. As we have already noted, the local state of an agent serves only for
the purpose of externally ascribing to the agent a state of knowledge. We do not
require that the agent actually maintains its local state: any representation that
suffices to correctly answer the queries of interest is admissible.
To model an ‘‘incremental’’ notion of implementation of model checking that is
related to the notions of implementations of knowledge-based programs studied
in (Fagin et al., 1995a; Meyden, 1996a), we introduce a class of automata.
Define an automaton with inputs 7 and properties 6 to be a tuple of the form
A=(Q, q, +, ?) , where
1. Q is a set of states,
2. q # Q is an initial state,
3. + : Q_7  Q is a function used to update a state given an input, and
4. ? : Q_6  [true, false] is a function assigning a truth value to each
property in each state of the automaton.
The first three components are standard; the final component simply serves to
provide a set of outputs at each state of the automaton. As usual, we may define
inductively the state A(_) of the automaton reached on the input of a sequence _
of inputs from 7 by A(=)=q (where = is the null string), and A(_ } x)=+(A(_), x).
These automata provide a class of implementations of model checking as follows.
If 8 is a set of formulae of LCn , we say A is an implementation in E (or E
a) of model
checking queries 8 over traces when A is an automaton with inputs 7=S, the set
of states of E, and properties 8, such that for all traces r of E and queries . # 8
we have ?(A(r), .)=true if and only if (E, r) < . (respectively, (Ea, r) < .).
Similarly, to define implementations of the agent-centric version of model check-
ing, suppose that 8i is a set of formulae of LCn of the form Ki .. Say that the
automaton A is an implementation in E (or Ea) of model checking queries 8i over
observations of agent i if A is an automaton with inputs O, the set of observations
in E, and properties 8i , such that for all traces r of E and queries . # 8i we have
?(A([r]i), .)=true if and only if (E, r) < . (respectively, ?(A([r]ai ), .)=true if
and only if (Ea, r) < .).
The external and agent-centric versions of the model checking problem are easily
seen to be inter-reducible. Given a procedure solving the external model checking
problem, we obtain a procedure for the agent-centric model checking problem
simply by restriction. In the other direction, suppose we are given for each agent
i a procedure Pi (l, Ki .) solving the agent-centric model checking problem for agent
i given the local state l and formulae of the form Ki .. Note that the formula
CG .#KiCG. is valid for any agent i in G. It follows that any formula in LCn can
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be rewritten as a boolean combination of atomic propositions and formulae of the
form Ki .. Thus we obtain a procedure for the general model checking problem that
uses the final state of the trace r to determine the truth value of atomic propositions
at r and makes the call Pi ([r]i , Ki .) (in the asynchronous case, Pi ([r]ai , Ki .)) for
subformulae of the form Ki ..
Viewing model checking as implemented by automata provides a way to measure
its inherent complexity in terms of space requirements. Clearly, maintaining just the
local state itself would suffice for the agent to be able to compute queries con-
cerning its knowledge (when this is a decidable problem). This requires an amount
of memory growing at least linearly with the length of the trace. Does any knowl-
edge representation more compact than the local state suffice? We will show in
Section 4 that for sets of queries 8 of bounded alternation depth, the answer to this
question is positivethere exists a procedure that, given 8 and an environment E,
produces finite state implementations of both agent-centric and external model
checking. Section 4.2 deals with the synchronous case and Section 4.3 with the asyn-
chronous case. A consequence of the work in the latter section is that model
checking formulae in Ln is in fact decidable in the asynchronous case.
3. A GENERAL UPPER BOUND FOR SYNCHRONOUS ENVIRONMENTS
We now provide an upper bound on the complexity, in the synchronous case, of
the most general form of the model checking problem, in which all three of the
parameters, the environment, the trace, and the formula, are varied. This also yields
an upper bound on the more restricted problems we consider.
The decidability of model checking in the synchronous structure ME is not too
hard to see. Note that because rti r$ implies that r and r$ have the same length,
the submodel of ME generated by a trace r contains only traces of the same length
as r. Since the set S of states is finite, there are only finitely many such traces, in
fact at most |S| |r|. Thus the generated submodels are all finite. Using Lemma 2.2 it
follows that model checking formulae in LCn is decidable, and the approach of
Proposition 2.1 may be used to obtain an algorithm that decides (E, r) < . in time
and space O( |.| } n } |S| 2 } |r| ).
This algorithm is exponential in both space and time. We now show that it is
possible to improve the space bound. The observation underlying the algorithm
with improved space complexity is that rather than construct the entire structure
generated by a trace, we can create traces only as they are needed by the model
checking computation and reuse the space after we are done with them. This yields
the following upper bound.
Proposition 3.1. The set [(E, r, .) | . # LCn , r # traces(E ) and (E, r) < .] is
in PSPACE.
Proof. The most convenient way to describe the computation is by means
of a standard reduction from alternating computations (Chandra et al., 1981). An
alternating Turing machine resembles a nondeterministic Turing machine inasmuch
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as each configuration derives up to two successors. However, in addition, each non-
final state of the machine is labeled either ‘‘universal’’ or ‘‘existential.’’ A computa-
tion tree generated by such a machine is accepting if either
v it consists of a single leaf node, and the state of the machine in that node
is a final accepting state, or
v the root node is labeled by a configuration with a universal state, and there
are two subtrees, both of which are accepting, or
v the root node is labeled by a configuration with an existential state, and
there are two subtrees, at least one of which is accepting.
The machine accepts an input if it generates an accepting computation tree when
started on an initial configuration for that input.
We show how to implement model checking by means of an alternating com-
putation, which we describe as a recursive procedure P(E, r, .), in which the
principal recursion is on the structure of the formula .. The treatment of atomic
formulae and the boolean operators is straightforward, so we discuss only the
modal operators Ki and CG of LCn . Note that we may write the truth conditions
for these in the form
v (E, r) < Ki . if for all traces r$ such that r$ has the same length as r, if rti r$
then (E, r$) < ., and
v (E, r) < CG . if for all traces r$ of the same length as r, if r$ is G-accessible
from r then (E, r$) < ..
The first of these conditions shows that P(E, r, Ki .) can be determined by an alter-
nating computation that uses |r| steps of universal branching to generate a trace r$
of the same length as r, then verifies that rti r$ and recursively calls P(E, r$, .).
The second condition requires determination of the G-accessible traces. This may
be done efficiently by means of a standard trick for space-efficient graph search in
alternating computations. Define the predicate REACH(r, r$, m, G ) to hold when
there exists a path of length at most m from r to r$ through the relations ti , for
i # G. This predicate may be computed recursively by noting that REACH
(r, r$, m, G ) holds for m>0 just when there exists a trace r" such that REACH(r, r",
Wm2X , G ) and REACH(r", r$, wm2x , G ). This recursive step may be implemented
by using |r| steps of existential branching to guess r", deterministically verifying
that r" is a trace, then universally branching to verify the two recursive calls. Note
that r$ is G-accessible from r if and only if REACH(r, r$, |S | |r|, G ) holds, where S
is the set of states of E. Thus the call REACH(r, r$, m, G ) may be implemented by
means of an alternating computation requiring space |E |+2|r| to represent the
environment and the traces, and space log ( |S | |r| ) for the counter m.
Using the routine REACH, we can now implement P(E, r, CG .) by universally
branching |r| steps to guess the trace r$, then universally branching to make the two
calls REACH(r, r$, |S | |r|, G ) and P(E, r$, .).
This shows that it is possible to construct an alternating Turing machine that
decides whether a formula . holds in a trace r of environment E, using work space
O( |E |+|r| } log( |E | )+|.| ) and O( |.| ) alternations. The result now follows from a
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generalization of Savitch’s Theorem proved in (Chandra et al., 1981), which states
that alternating computations using space S(n) and A(n) alternations may be
simulated in deterministic space A(n) S(n)+S(n)2. K
We remark that the improvement in the space bound obtained in this result
comes at the cost of an increased computation time, since the algorithm described,
when implemented deterministically, may perform much redundant computation,
repeatedly considering the same trace. In the current state of knowledge about the
relationship between deterministic space and time, it is likely to be difficult to avoid
this cost.
We will show later (Theorem 5.1) that the above bound is tight. The following
section shows that this bound can be improved for formulae not containing com-
mon knowledge.
4. BOUNDED ALTERNATION FORMULAE
In this section we treat a special case of the model checking problem, in which
the formulae checked are in Ln , i.e., do not contain common knowledge operators.
We will show that if the formulae of interest are of bounded alternation depth, then
it is possible to construct finite state implementations for both external and agent-
centric model checking. Consequently, it is not necessary for agents to maintain
their sequence of observations in this case. This result applies to both the syn-
chronous case and the asynchronous case. A consequence of these results is that
model checking formulae in Ln is in fact decidable in the asynchronous case.
The idea underlying these results is that for the purpose of providing semantics
for formulae of alternation depth at most k, Kripke structures contain in general a
considerable amount of redundancy, and the relevant information can be com-
pressed into a class of much smaller structures. These structures, called k-trees, are
introduced in Section 4.1. In order to exploit these structures in implementations of
model checking, it is necessary to show that the compression operation commutes
with an operation that updates the compressed representations. This is done for the
synchronous case in Section 4.2 and for the asynchronous case in Section 4.3.
4.1. Trees
The structures we will use for the compact representation of the information
expressed by a world in a Kripke structure will be a type of finite tree in which ver-
tices are labeled by states of the environment and edges are labeled by agents. It is
convenient to represent these trees as follows.
We assume throughout this section that we have been given a fixed finite set S
of states equipped with a valuation function V : S_Prop  [0, 1]. In applications,
S will be the set of states of an environment and V the associated valuation.
For numbers k0 and agents i we define by mutual recursion the set Tk of
k-trees over S, the set Tk, i of i-objective k-trees over S, and the set Fk, i of forests
of i-objective k-trees over S. Define T0 to be the set of tuples of the form
(s, <, ..., <) where s # S and the number of copies of the empty set < is equal to
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n, the number of agents. For each agent i we also define T0, i to be equal to T0 .
Once Tk, i has been defined, let Fk, i be the set of all subsets of Tk, i . Now, define
Tk+1 to be the union of Tk with the set of all tuples of the form (s, U1 , ..., Un) ,
where s # S and Ui is in Fk, i for each i=1 } } } n. Finally, for each i let Tk+1, i be the
set of tuples (s, U1 , ..., Un) in Tk where Ui is the empty set.
Intuitively, in the tuple (s, U1 , ..., Un), the state s represents the actual state of
the world, and for each i the set Ui represents the knowledge of agent i. Identifying
a 0-tree (s, <, ..., <) with the state s, note that each component Ui in a 1-tree is
simply a set of states, representing agent i ’s knowledge about the world. For higher
k the set Ui represents agent i ’s knowledge both about the world and other agents’
knowledge, up to alternation depth k.
Lemma 4.1. The number of k-trees over S is less than Ck=exp(2n |S |, k)n, where
exp(x, k) is the function defined by exp(x, 0)=x and exp(x, k+1)=x2exp(x, k).
The elements of Tk correspond in an obvious way to trees of height k, with edges
labeled by agents and vertices labeled by states in S. If w=(s, U1 , ..., Un) we define
root(w) to be the state s. If v is an element of Ui , then we say that v is an i-child
of w. When w # T0 the labeled tree corresponding to w consists of just the root,
labeled root(w). The tree corresponding to w # Tk+1 has root labeled with root(w),
and for each i-child v # Tk of w there is an i-labeled edge from the root to a vertex
at which the labeled subtree is that corresponding to v.
The number of vertices of the labeled tree corresponding to a k-tree is
O((Ck&1)2). Note that because an i-child of a k+1-tree is an i-objective k-tree,
there does not exist in these labeled trees a pair of consecutive edges with the same
label i. An additional constraint follows from the fact that the Ui are sets and hence
do not contain repetitions: the subtrees at two distinct i-children of any vertex must
be non-isomorphic. Using the correspondence between k-trees and labeled trees, an
element U of Fk, i may be regarded as a forest of labeled trees.
We now show how formulae may be interpreted in k-trees, by defining a relation
w < . between formulae . in Ln and k-trees w. First, if w=(s, U1 , ..., Un) is a
k-tree and V is a forest of i-objective k$-trees, define w Vi V to be the tuple (s, U1 , ...,
Ui&1 , V, Ui+1 , ..., Un). Note that this is a max(k, 1+k$)-tree. Now define the
satisfaction relation w < . by the following recursion on the structure of .:
1. w < p for propositional constants p if V(root(w), p)=1 (where V is the
valuation on the set S),
2. w < c. if not w < .,
3. w < .1 7.2 if w < .1 and w < .2 ,
4. w < Ki. if v Vi Ui < . for all v # Ui , where w=(s, U1 , ..., Un).
We remark that that this definition may be shown to be equivalent to one
obtained by constructing a tree-like Kripke structure from w, and interpreting for-
mulae at the root of this structure. The worlds of this Kripke structure are just the
vertices of the labeled tree corresponding to w. If a vertex v of w is labeled by a state
s, then we take the proposition p to be true at v just when V(s, p)=1. The
appropriate accessibility relations are not exactly those obtained from the tree
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edges, however. We define the accessibility relation Ki to be the relation such that
each vertex may access its successors through edges labeled i, and all successors of
a vertex through edges labeled i may access each other. This makes the accessibility
relations transitive and Euclidean, but not equivalence relations, since if there is an
i-labeled edge from u to v then uKi v but not vKi u.2
Example 4.2. Figure 2 depicts a 2-tree for two agents. The vertices of this tree
are labeled by the states s, t, u, v, and the edges are labeled by agents. Thus, the
subtree at the left 1-child of the root represents the tuple x=(s, <, [(s, <, <) ,
(u, <, <)]) , the subtree at the right 1-child of the root represents the tuple
y=(t, <, [(t, <, <)]) , and the diagram as a whole represents the 2-tree
(s, [x, y], <) . The tree edges are represented by solid lines, and the additional
edges required to interpret the 2-tree as a Kripke structure are indicated by means
of broken lines.
We now show that when dealing with formulae of alternation depth at most k,
it suffices to work with k-trees rather than arbitrary Kripke structures. Suppose
M=(W, K1 , ..., Kn , VM) is an S5n structure and let f be a function mapping the
worlds of M to the set of states S. We assume f preserves the valuation, i.e., for all
worlds r # W and propositions p, we have VM(r, p)=V( f (r), p), where V is the
valuation on S. (In our applications of the following results, M will be the Kripke
structure generated by an environment with states S and f will be the final state
mapping on traces. Hence we use the symbol r to denote worlds of M.) We will
show that there exists a k-tree that represents the set of all formulae of alternation
depth k or less which hold at a given world in M. Intuitively, the appropriate k-tree
is that obtained by unfolding the Kripke structure into an infinite tree, pruning this
tree to height k, and identifying sibling vertices that generate isomorphic subtrees.
First, define the i-objectification function obji , that for each k maps k-trees to
i-objective k-trees, by obji (w)=w Vi <. For k0 and agents i define the functions
Fk : W  Tk and Uk, i : W  Fk, i by mutual recursion as follows. If k=0, then define
Fk(r)=( f (r), <, ..., <). For k0, define Fk+1(r)=( f (r), Uk, 1(r), ..., Uk, n(r)) ,
where Uk, i (r)=[obji (Fk(r$)) | rKi r$].
Example 4.3. Consider the S52 Kripke structure M with five worlds r1 } } } r5 ,
whose accessibility relations have the equivalence classes [r1 , r2 , r3] and [r4 , r5]
for agent 1, and [r1 , r3 , r4 , r5] and [r2] for agent 2. Suppose that the state map-
ping f is given by f (r1)= f (r3)= f (r5)=s, f (r2)=t and f (r4)=u. Then the 2-tree
obj2(F2(r1)) is that depicted in Fig. 2. Note that obj1(F1(r1))=obj1(F1(r3))=
(s, <, [(s, <, <) , (u, <, <)]). Thus, although there are three worlds x such
that r1t1 x, the fact that U1, 1(r1) is a set of 1-trees means that the images of two
of these worlds are identified.
The following result shows that Fk(r) represents the formulae of alternation
depth k or less holding at the world r.
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FIG. 2. A 2-tree.
Proposition 4.4. If . is a formula of Ln of alternation depth less than or equal
to k then for all worlds r of M we have M, r < . if and only if Fk(r) < ..
Proof. The proof requires establishing an additional property of the mapping
Fk . Say that a formula . is k, i-compatible, where k0 and i is an agent, if . has
alternation depth less than or equal to k and has no subformulae of the form Kj 
with j=% i and alternation depth equal to k. Note that if Ki . is a formula of alterna-
tion depth k then . is a k, i-compatible formula. In addition to the main claim we
prove that if . is k, i-compatible then M, r < . if and only if obji (Fk(r)) Vi
Uk, i (r) < .. (Note that obji (Fk(r)) Vi Uk, i (r) is a k+1-tree.) The proof is by
simultaneous induction on the structure of ..
The base case follows directly from the fact that root(Fk(r))= fin(r). The cases
involving the boolean operators are straightforward. We prove the main claim in
the case that . is a formula of the form Ki .$ of alternation depth k. The argument
for the additional property in this case is similar. By definition, Fk(r) < Ki .$ if
and only if u Vi Uk&1, i (r) < .$ for all u # Uk&1, i (r). But the trees in Uk&1, i (r)
are precisely the k&1-trees obji (Fk&1(r$)) for r$ti r. Moreover, if r$ti r then
Uk&1, i (r)=Uk&1, i (r$). Using the definition of the relation < in k-trees, it follows
that Fk(r) < Ki .$ if and only if obji (Fk&1(r$)) V i Uk&1, i (r$) < .$ for all r$ti r.
Since .$ is k, i-compatible, we obtain using the inductive hypothesis and the seman-
tics of Ki that Fk(r) < Ki .$ if and only if M, r < Ki .$. K
We remark that it suffices that the accessibility relations Ki be transitive and
Euclidean, so Proposition 4.4 also applies to K45n , the logic of belief (Chellas,
1980; Halpern and Moses, 1992).
The k-trees, as defined above, are closely related to the k-worlds defined in
(Fagin et al., 1991), and Proposition 4.4 resembles a result implicit in Theorem 3.1
of that paper. However, there are a number of significant technical differences. First,
k-trees are more succinct than the corresponding k-worlds, which have many
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components that redundantly model the same information, and consequently
require a number of constraints to ensure that these components are consistent.
Second, the definition of the satisfaction relation < for k-worlds applies only for
formulae with k levels of nesting of knowledge operators (where, e.g., the formula
K1K1p has two levels of nesting), whereas Proposition 4.4 works for the larger class
of formulae of alternation depth k. This difference is not an essential oneit can be
shown that the k-world corresponding to a world of a K45 (or S5) structure does
contain the appropriate information for dealing with formulae of alternation depth
k, so the definition of satisfaction in k-worlds could be modified along the lines of
our definition for k-trees to yield a result similar to Proposition 4.4. We note
however, that our definition would not work for logics weaker than K45.
Finally, whereas k-worlds are constructed over a basis of truth assignments,
k-trees are built over a basis of a set of states S equipped with a valuation. The
reason for this difference is that we are interested in the dynamic behavior of
knowledge in the Kripke structures generated by an environment, so we need to
maintain more information than just the truth assignment associated with a world.
This will become clearer in the next section, where we show how to exploit this
extra information.
4.2. Synchronous Systems
We now consider model checking of formulae in Ln for the synchronous case.
We will show in this section how k-trees can be used to provide implementations
of both external and agent-centric model checking. It follows from the result of the
previous section that there exists a k-tree that provides a compact representation of
the formulae of alternation depth k holding at a trace. The main contribution of
this section is to show that this k-tree can be computed in a space-efficient manner.
As a first step, let us specialize Proposition 4.4 to the Kripke structure ME corre-
sponding to an environment E=(S, I, T, O1 , ..., On , V) with observations O. Take
the k-trees Tk to be constructed over the states S of this environment, and the
valuation on S to be the valuation V of E. Next, choose the function f to be the
final state mapping fin from the set of worlds traces(E ) of ME to S. For the remain-
der of this section, we take Fk to be the mappings that result from these choices.
By the definition of ME , the mapping fin preserves the valuation. Thus, we obtain
the following corollary of Proposition 4.4.
Corollary 4.5. For every trace r of E and sentence . of Ln of alternation depth
less than or equal to k, we have (E, r) < . if and only if Fk(r) < ..
Since the size of Fk(r) is O((Ck)2), which is independent of the length of r, this
result shows that model checking at a trace r may be carried out by a computation
in a structure which, for sufficiently long traces, is smaller than the component of
ME generated by the trace. Of course, if it is necessary to first construct this compo-
nent of ME in order to compute Fk(r) this is no gain. However, as we now show,
there is a more efficient, incremental way to construct Fk(r): if rs is a trace consist-
ing of a prefix r and final state s, then the k-tree Fk(rs) can be computed from the
k-tree Fk(r) and the state s.
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To motivate the definitions to follow, consider first the depth one case. Let F1(r)
be the 1-tree (t, U1 , ..., Un) , where t is the final state of r. For each agent i the set
Ui may be viewed as the set of states agent i considers possible in the trace r, by
identifying each 0-tree (x, <, ..., <) with the state x. When the trace is extended
by adding the new state s, we obtain a new 1-tree F1(rs), which must be of the form
(s, U $1 , ..., U $n) for some sets Ui$, representing the states agent i considers possible
in the trace rs. Thus, the main question is how to determine these new sets Ui$ from
the old sets Ui and the fact that the actual transition being made in the environ-
ment is one from state t to state s.
Let o=Oi (s) be the new observation agent i makes when the state changes from
t to s. This observation may be the same as the agent’s observation in the state t,
but since we are assuming that the system is synchronous, the agent is aware that
a transition has taken place, and knows that the new state gives rise to observation
o. Thus, if a state s$ is not reachable in a single step from a state in Ui , or it is not
the case that Oi (s$)=o, then the agent should not consider s$ to be a possible state
in the trace rs. However, if the agent considered a state t$ # Ui to be possible in the
trace r, and a state s$ with Oi (s$)=o is reachable in one step of the environment
from t$, then the above considerations do not suffice for the agent to exclude s$ from
its set of possibilities in the trace rs. This suggests that
Ui$=[s$ # S | _t$ # Ui[t$Ts$ and Oi (s$)=o]]. (1)
The calculation of the right hand side of this equation is depicted in Fig. 3, in which
the points represent states of the environment and the letters represent the observa-
tions made by agent i at these states. Note that if the agent has perfect recall and
complete knowledge of the possible transitions of the environment, it can calculate
this set from its old knowledge set Ui and its new observation o.
This discussion has suggested how an agent may update its knowledge about the
state and indicated how we can compute F1(rs) given F1(r) and s. For higher levels
of knowledge, i.e., including agents’ knowledge about other agents’ knowledge,
represented in k+1-trees for k>1, we apply this intuition recursively. Suppose
FIG. 3. Updating an agent’s knowledge set.
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we have already determined a function Gk mapping a k-tree w and a state s to a
k-tree Gk(w, s) that represents the result of updating w when the state of the
environment changes to s. We wish to determine how to compute from a k+1-tree
(t, U1 , ..., Un) a new k+1-tree (s, U$1, ..., U$n) representing the agents’ knowledge
when the state of the environment changes from t to s.
Note that the root of a k-tree represents the state of the environment. Arguing
as above, this suggests that agent i will consider possible in the trace rs the set of
states s$ such that Oi (s$)=Oi (s) and for some k-tree w in Ui there exists a transi-
tion of the environment from root(w) to s$. However, a state s$ is not quite what
we seek for the set Ui$we need instead a k-tree encoding information about the
other agents’ states of knowledge. Since the system is synchronous, the agent is
aware that other agents are also updating their knowledge. If it considers w a
possible situation in the trace r, and it knows that this update process may be
represented by the function Gk , then in the trace rs it should consider the k-tree
Gk(w, s$) to be a possible representation of the actual situation.
This motivates the following definitions. Define for each number k0 the func-
tion Gk : Tk_S  Tk , by induction on k. The definition of Gk will be by mutual
recursion with the functions Hk, i : Fk, i_O  Fk, i , where i is an agent and k0.
Intuitively, if agent i ’s state of knowledge (to level k) is represented by the the set
of k-trees U, then Hk, i (U, o) represents the agent’s revised state of knowledge after
it makes the observation o.
We define G0(w, s)=(s, <, ..., <) . Once Gk has been defined, we define for each
i the function Hk, i by taking Hk, i (U, o) to be the set of k-trees Gk(v, s) where v # U,
there exists a transition of E from root(v) to s, and Oi (s)=o. Using the functions
Hk, i , we may now define Gk+1 by the equation
Gk+1((s, U1 , ..., Un) , s$)=(s$, Hk, 1[U1 , O1(s$)], ..., Hk, n[Un , On(s$)]) .
Note that if U is the empty set then Hk, i (U, o) is also empty. It follows from this
that Gk maps k-trees to k-trees, and also maps i-objective k-trees to i-objective k-trees,
so these definitions are proper. Note also that Gk(obji (w), s)=obji (Gk(w, s)). The
following result shows how these functions may be used to compute Fk incrementally.
Lemma 4.6. For every trace rs of E and every number k, Fk(rs)=Gk(Fk(r), s).
Proof. By induction on k. Note that for every trace rs, we have that
F0(rs)=(s, <, ..., <) =G0(F0(r), s). Hence the claim holds for k=0. Assume that
it holds for k. Note first that root(Gk+1(Fk+1(r), s))=s=root(Fk+1(rs)). We show
that Gk+1(Fk+1(r), s) and Fk+1(rs) have the same i-children. By definition of Gk+1
and Fk+1 , the k-tree w is an i-child of Gk+1(Fk+1(r), s) if and only if w # Hk, i
(Uk, i (r), Oi (s)). By definition of Hk, i , this is the case if and only if there exists a
k-tree v # Uk, i (r) and a state s$ # S such that w=Gk(v, s$), there is a transition of E
from root(v) to s$, and Oi (s$)=Oi (s).
By definition of Uk, i , the k-tree v is in Uk, i (r) if and only if v=obji (Fk(r$)) for
some trace r$ # traces(E) such that rti r$. In this case root(v) is the final state of r$,
so for all states s$ the sequence r$s$ is a trace of E just when there is a transition
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from root(v) to s$. Further, from the induction hypothesis we have Gk(Fk(r$), s$)=
Fk(r$s$), which implies Gk(obji (Fk(r$)), s$)=obji (Fk(r$s$)) by the remark above.
Finally, rsti r$s$ just when rti r$ and Oi (s)=Oi (s$).
Putting these pieces together, we obtain that w is an i-child of Gk+1(Fk+1(r), s)
if and only if there exists a trace r$s$ of E with r$s$ti rs and w=obji (Fk(r$s$)). The
latter holds just when w is an i-child of Fk+1(rs). This establishes Gk+1(Fk+1(r), s)
=Fk+1(rs). K
If r is a trace of length one then Fk(r) may be straightforwardly computed: if r
consists of the single initial state s then F0(r)=(s, <, ..., <) and Fk+1(r) is the
k+1-tree with root s and an i-child obji (Fk(s$)) for each initial state s$ with
Oi (s$)=Oi (s). Together with the above result, this yields the following charac-
terization of the complexity of implementations of model checking in ME .
Theorem 4.7. In every finite state environment E there exists
1. a finite state implementation in E over traces of model checking the set of
formulae 8k of alternation depth at most k, and
2. a finite state implementation in E over observations of agent i of model
checking the set of formulae in 8k of the form Ki ..
In both cases, for formulae . of alternation depth k or less, (E, r) < . is decided in
time O((Ck&1)2 } ( |r|+|.| )).
Proof. We describe the automata A=(Q, q0 , +, ?) in each case. The fact that
they provide implementations is direct from Corollary 4.5 and Lemma 4.6. The
upper bound follows from the observation that the satisfaction relation in k-trees
corresponds to model checking in a Kripke structure generated by the tree,
Proposition 2.1, and the fact that k-trees have size O((Ck&1)2).
In the external case, take Q=Tk _ [q0], where q0 is some new object that will
serve as the initial state of the automaton. The update function + : Q_S  Q is
given by +(w, s)=Fk(s) when w=q0 and +(w, s)=Gk(w, s) otherwise. The function
? is given by ?(w, .)=true if and only if w < ..
In the agent-centric case, take Q=Fk&1, i _ [q0], where q0 is some new object.
The update function + : Q_O  Q is given by +(U, o)=[obji (Fk&1(s)) | s # I and
Oi (s)=o] when w=q0 and +(U, o)=Hk&1, i (U, o) otherwise. Finally, the function
? is given by ?(U, Ki .)=true if and only if w Vi U < . for all w # U. K
In particular, we see that to model check formulae of alternation depth bounded
by a constant it suffices to maintain a data structure of constant size. Note that this
result trades in the exponential time dependence on the length of trace of Proposi-
tion 3.1 for a linear time dependence on the length of trace, but at the cost of non-
elementary dependence on alternation depth. Thus for high alternation depth for-
mulae this approach is unlikely to be practicable without further optimization.
When dealing with very deep formulae in short traces, the algorithm of Proposi-
tion 3.1 may well be more efficient.
A special case of Theorem 4.7 worth noting is when n=1, i.e., there is just a
single agent. Since all formulae of L1 are of alternation depth one or zero, it suffices
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to work with 1-trees, which are tuples of the form (s, U) where s is a state and U
is a set of states. The set U is updated according to Eq. (1). This update computa-
tion is closely related to (though not subsumed by) the Possible Model Approach
to the semantics of database updates of (Winslett, 1988) and to the generalization
of this approach in (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991). Similar ideas occur in the
discussion of knowledge in robotics of (Rosenschein, 1985) and in the standard
theory of state identification in finite state automata (Kohavi, 1970). Thus the
theory of this section may be viewed as generalizing certain aspects of standard
accounts of update in the single agent context. We note that our results make
explicit the validity of this update computation under the assumption of perfect
recall, which is not generally considered in this literature.
Theorem 4.7 clearly subsumes the situation in which we wish to check a fixed
formula of Ln in traces of increasing length, giving the following characterization,
which we will later use as a basis for comparison with common knowledge
formulae.
Corollary 4.8. Let . be a fixed formula of Ln and let E be a fixed environment.
Then the set [r # traces(E ) | (E, r) < .] is regular.
In general, the finite state automata obtained by the methods of this section will
not be minimal, so further optimization may be possible.
4.3. Asynchronous Environments
In the synchronous case, we were able to establish the decidability of model
checking all formulae in LCn by noting that the substructure of ME generated by
any trace is finite. As shown by Example 2.5, this is no longer the case when
environments are interpreted asynchronously: in this example the substructure
generated by any trace is the entire structure. We will show in Section 5 that this
results in formulae involving common knowledge having an undecidable model
checking problem in M aE . Nevertheless, formulae not containing common
knowledge operators remain decidable. We will obtain this result in the present sec-
tion as a consequence of an incremental computation for model checking formulae
in Ln in the structure M aE , which generalizes the techniques of the previous section.
The basic data structure we employ will again be k-trees. For the remainder of
this section, we assume that these trees have been constructed over the states S of
the environment E, and that the mappings Fk and Uk, i of Section 4.1 are defined
with respect to the structure M=M aE . We take the function f required by the
definition to be the final state mapping on traces. Thus, we obtain the following
consequence of Proposition 4.4.
Corollary 4.9. For every trace r of E and formula . of Ln of alternation depth
less than or equal to k, we have (Ea, r) < . if and only if Fk(r) < ..
This result shows that instead of checking the infinite structure M aE , we may
check the finite structures Fk(r). To complete the generalization of the results of the
previous section, we need to show how to incrementally compute the functions Fk .
In the synchronous case, the traces indistinguishable to agent i from a trace of the
137COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND UPDATE
File: 643J 267924 . By:XX . Date:20:01:98 . Time:15:41 LOP8M. V8.B. Page 01:01
Codes: 2988 Signs: 2224 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
form rs are all of the form r$s$, where rti r$ and Oi (s)=Oi (s$). This is no longer
the case under the asynchronous semantics, where we may have rsri r$s1s2 } } } sl ,
with rri r$ and Oi (s1)=Oi (s2)= } } } =Oi (sl). This means that a direct application
of the previous approach does not workwe may need to look further than the
‘‘next state’’ in computing Fk(rs) from Fk(r).
To understand this in the depth one case, suppose that F1(r)=(t, U1 , ..., Un)
and F1(rs)=(s, U$1, ..., U$n). Identifying a 0-tree with the state at its root as usual,
the sets Ui and Ui$ are sets of states of the environment. We seek to express Ui$ in
terms of Ui and the observation o=Oi (s) made by agent i when the state changes
to s.
Let us first note a property of the sets Ui and Ui$these sets are closed under
transitions that preserve agent i ’s observation. That is, if state x is in Ui and there
is a transition of the environment from x to a state y with Oi (x)=Oi ( y) then y also
is in Ui . This is direct from the definitions of F1 and asynchronous local states. In
particular, we see that if the observation o is the same as the observation of agent
i in the final state of r then the agent’s local state does not change, so in this case
we must have Ui$=Ui .
Next, suppose that the observation o is different from the observation o$ made by
the agent in the final state of r. Then the agent is aware that its observation has
changed from o$ to o. If previously it considered the state t$ possible, and there is
a transition from t$ to a state s$ with Oi (s$)=o then, as we argued in the syn-
chronous case, the agent should consider the state s$ possible, so we should have
s$ # Ui$. However, as we noted above, the set Ui$ should be closed under transitions
preserving the agent’s observation o. This suggests that Ui$ is the smallest set V such
that
1. t$ # V for all t$ such that Oi (t$)=o and there exists an s$ # Ui with s$Tt$,
and
2. V is closed under transitions preserving agent i ’s observation.
This set is depected in Fig. 4.
Note that because of cycles in the transition relation, there may exist arbitrarily
large l such that rsri r$s1s2 } } } sl and Oi (sj)=o for j=1 } } } l. In the depth one case,
FIG. 4. Updating an agent’s asynchronous knowledge set.
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we are interested only in the states that an agent considers possible, so it suffices
to restrict attention to traces in which the si do not repeat. However, once we con-
sider what an agent knows about other agents’ knowledge, it may be the case that
the other agents have different states of knowledge in the traces r$s1 and r$s1 s2 } } } sl
even when s1=sl . Thus, in order to reach a trace at which a certain state of
knowledge of the other agents obtains, it may be necessary to traverse a cycle many
times. The main observation underlying the decidability result of this section is that
if we are interested in knowledge only up to alternation level k, then the number
of possible states of knowledge of the other agents is finite. Thus, we need only
traverse cycles, collecting k-trees representing these states of knowledge, until we
reach a ‘‘fixpoint’’ where all further transitions fail to produce new possibilities.
To formalize this intuition, we define for each k0 a function Gak : Tk_S  Tk
which will play a role analogous to that of the function Gk of the previous section. The
definition is by means of a mutual recursion with the functions H ak, i : Fk, i_O  Fk, i ,
where i is an agent and k0. Like the function Hk, i used in the synchronous case,
the function H ak, i maps a state of knowledge U of agent i and an observation o to
the agent’s new state of knowledge H ak, i (U, o) upon making the observation o.
Thus, as above, we define Ga0(w, s)=(s, <, ..., <) , and
Gak+1((s, U1 , ..., Un) , s$)=(s$, H
a
k, 1[U1 , O1(s$)], ..., H
a
k, n[Un , On(s$)]).
To define the function H ak, i , we assume that G
a
k has been defined. The definition
makes use of an auxiliary function Jk, i, o : Fk, i  Fk, i . Intuitively, this function com-
putes the update agent i would perform on making observation o if it knew that
either zero or one steps have been taken through the transition relation. Thus, if
U # Fk, i , we put
Jk, i, o(U )=[w # U | Oi (root(w))=o]
_ [G ak(w, s) | w # U and root(w) Ts and Oi (s)=o].
The following result states some basic properties of Jk, i, o .
Lemma 4.10.
(1) The function Jk, i, o is monotonic; i.e., if U1U2 then Jk, i, o(U1)Jk, i, o(U2).
(2) For all U, Jk, i, o(U )J 2k, i, o(U ).
It follows from Lemma 4.10 that for all U we have Jk, i, o(U )J 2k, i, o(U )
J3k, i, o(U ) } } } . Since these values are subsets of the finite set Tk, i , this implies that
there exists some m for which J mk, i, o(U )=J
m+1
k, i, o(U ). We define H
a
k, i (U, o) to be this
fixpoint value J mk, i, o(U ). Observe that in the case that k=0 and the agent’s observa-
tion has changed this fixpoint value corresponds to the set Ui$ depicted in Fig. 4.
This completes the definition of the H ak, i and G
a
k . Note that if U is the empty set
then H ak, i (U, o) is also empty. It follows from this that G
a
k maps k-trees to k-trees
and also maps i-objective k-trees to i-objective k-trees, so these definitions are
proper. Note also that G ak(obji (w), s)=obji (G
a
k(w, s)). We now set out to establish
the following recursion relation, which gives the incremental way to compute Fk .
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Proposition 4.11. For every trace rs we have G ak(Fk(r), s)=Fk(rs).
The proof of this result will be by induction on k. It is convenient to introduce
the partial order on k-trees defined by (s, U1 , ..., Un)(s$, U$1 , ..., U$n) when
s=s$ and UiUi$ for all i=1 } } } n. The base case k=0 of Proposition 4.11 follows
immediately from the definitions of G a0 and F0 . We assume that G
a
k(Fk(r), s)=
Fk(rs) for all traces rs and show that G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s)=Fk+1(rs), by establishing
that Fk+1(rs)G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s) and G
a
k+1(Fk+1(r), s)Fk+1(rs). For the first of
these inequalities, we make use of the following result.
Lemma 4.12.
(1) If rs and r$s$ are traces with r$ri r and Oi (s$)=Oi (s) then obji (Fk(r$s$)) is
an i-child of G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s).
(2) Suppose s is a state and let r$s$ be a trace with Oi (s$)=Oi (s). For all
w # Tk , if obji (Fk(r$)) is an i-child of G ak+1(w, s) then obji (Fk(r$s$)) is an i-child of
Gak+1(w, s).
Proof. For (1), observe that if r$ri r then by the definition of U ak, i , we have that
obji (Fk(r$)) is in U ak, i (r). Let o=Oi (s). Now Oi (s$)=o and there is a transition
from root(Fk(r$))= fin(r$) to s$, hence by the second part of the definition of Jk, i, o
we have that G ak(obji (Fk(r$)), s$) is an element of Jk, i, o(U
a
k, i (r)). By definition of
H ak, i , we have Jk, i, o(U
a
k, i (r))H
a
k, i (U
a
k, i (r), o). By the the induction hypothesis
and the remark above, G ak(obji (Fk(r$)), s$)=obji (G
a
k(Fk(r$), s$))=obji (Fk(r$s$)).
Thus obji (Fk(r$s$)) is in H ak, i (U
a
k, i (r), o), hence an i-child of G
a
k+1(Fk+1(r), s).
For (2), suppose G ak+1(w, s)=(s, U1 , ..., Un) and let o=Oi (s). By the induction
hypothesis, we have obji (Fk(r$s$))=G ak(obji (Fk(r$)), s$). Note that since r$s$ is a
trace, there is a transition from root(Fk(r$))= fin(r$) to s$. In addition, Oi(s$)=o.
It follows using the second part of the definition of Jk, i, o that if obji (Fk(r$)) is in
Ui then obji (Fk(r$s$)) is in Jk, i, o(Ui). But by definition of G ak , we have that
Ui=H ak, i (V, o) for some forest V of k-trees. Since Jk, i, o(H
a
k, i (V, o))=H
a
k, i (V, o)
for all V, we obtain that obji (Fk(r$s$)) is in Ui . This establishes the result. K
We may now show that Fk+1(rs)G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s). It is clear that root(Fk+1(rs))
=s=root(G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s)). Suppose that v is an i-child of Fk+1(rs). Then by
definition of Fk+1 there exists a trace r$ such that r$ri rs and v=obji (Fk(r$)). We
consider two cases and show that in both cases v is an i-child of G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s).
First, suppose Oi ( fin(r))=Oi (s)=o. Then we have r$ri rsri r, hence v is in
Uak, i (r), by definition of U
a
k, i . Since Oi (root(v))=Oi ( fin(r$))=o it then follows
from the first part of the definition of Jk, i, o that v is in Jk, i, o(U ak, i (r)) and conse-
quently in H ak, i (U
a
k, i (r), s). This shows that v is an i-child of G
a
k+1(Fk+1(r), s).
Second, suppose Oi ( fin(r)){Oi (s). Then r$ may be written as r1s1 } } } sm
where r1ri r and Oi (sj)=Oi (s) for all j=1, ..., m. Since r1ri r, it follows from
Lemma 4.12(1) that obji (Fk(r1 s1)) is an i-child of G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s). Now, by
repeated use of Lemma 4.12(2) it follows that obji (Fk(r1s1 } } } sm))=v is an i-child
of G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s).
This completes the proof that Fk+1(rs)G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s). For the converse
inequality, we need another lemma.
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Lemma 4.13. For all traces rs and o=Oi (s) we have
(1) Jk, i, o(U ak, i (r))U
a
k, i (rs) and
(2) Jk, i, o(U ak, i (rs))U
a
k, i (rs).
Proof. For (1), suppose that v is in Jk, i, o(U ak, i (r)). We consider the two clauses
of the definition of Jk, i, o . First, if v arises from the first clause of the definition of
Jk, i, o then v # U ak, i (r) and Oi (root(v))=Oi (s). By the definition of U
a
k, i there
exists a trace r$ri r such that v=obji (Fk(r$)). Thus Oi ( fin(r))=Oi ( fin(r$))=
Oi (root(v))=Oi (s), which implies that rsri r. Hence rsri r$, and we obtain that
v=obji (Fk(r$)) is in U ak, i (rs).
Next, if v arises from the second clause then there exists v$ # U ak, i (r), a state s$
such that Oi (s$)=Oi (s) and root(v$) Ts$, and we have v=G ak(v$, s$). From the
definition of U ak, i we obtain that v$=obji (Fk(r$)) for some trace r$ri r. This trace
satisfies fin(r$)=root(v$), so we have that r$s$ is a trace and r$s$ri rs. Thus, using
the induction hypothesis, v=G ak(v$, s$)=G
a
k(obji (Fk(r$)), s$)=obji (Fk(r$s$)). It there-
fore follows from the fact that r$s$ri rs and the definition of U ak, i that v is in U ak, i (rs).
This completes the proof of (1).
For (2), suppose v is in Jk, i, o(U ak, i (rs)). If v arises from the first clause of the
definition of Jk, i, o , then it is immediate that v is in U ak, i (rs). If v arises from the
second clause of the definition of Jk, i, o then there exists v$ # U ak, i (rs), a state s$ such
that Oi (s$)=Oi (s) and root(v$) Ts$, and we have v=G ak(v$, s$). It follows using the
definition of U ak, i that there exists a trace r$ri rs such that v$=obji (Fk(r$)). Since
fin(r$)=root(v$)Ts$, we obtain that r$s$ is a trace. Because Oi (s$)=Oi (s) we
also have that r$s$ri rs. Now, using the induction hypothesis, we have that
v=G ak(v$, s$)=G
a
k(obji (Fk(r$)), s$)=obji (Fk(r$s$)). Hence v is in U
a
k, i (rs) by the
definition of U ak, i . K
The inequality G ak+1(Fk+1(r), s)Fk+1(rs) follows directly from Lemma 4.13.
To see this, note that Lemma 4.13(1), together with the monotonicity of Jk, i, o ,
implies that (Jk, i, o)2 (U ak, i (r))Jk, i, o(U
a
k, i (rs)). From this, using Lemma 4.13(2),
we obtain (Jk, i, o)2 (U ak, i (rs)))U
a
k, i (rs). Repeating this argument, we see that
(Jk, i, o)m (U ak, i (r))U
a
k, i (rs) for all m1. By definition of G
a
k+1 , this implies that
Gak+1(Fk+1(r), s))Fk+1(rs). This completes the proof of Proposition 4.11.
We have now seen how to compute Fk(rs) from Fk(r). It remains to show how
to calculate Fk(r) when r is a trace of length one. In the synchronous case, this was
straightforward, since it required only the examination of the initial states and
observation relation. In the asynchronous case, this no longer suffices, and we need
a fixpoint computation similar to that just described. For each number k0 define
the function gak : I  Tk by g
a
0(s)=(s, <, ..., <) and for k>0 by g
a
k(s)=
Gak( fk(s), s), where fk(s) is the k-tree with root s such that v is an i-child of fk(s)
if and only if v=obji (gak&1(s$)) for some initial state s$ # I with Oi (s$)=Oi (s).
Lemma 4.14. For all s # I we have gak(s)=Fk(s).
Proof. By induction on k. For k=0 the result is immediate from the definitions.
We suppose that gak&1(s)=Fk&1(s) for all s # S, and show that g
a
k(s)=Fk(s) by
establishing gak(s)Fk(s) and Fk(s)g
a
k(s). Clearly root(Fk(s))=s=root(g
a
k(s)).
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First, we show that gak(s)Fk(s). By the induction hypothesis and the definitions
of fk and Fk , we have fk(s)Fk(s). The monotonicity of Jk, i, o implies that
Gak is monotonic in its first argument, so we obtain that g
a
k(s)=G
a
k( fk(s), s)
Gak(Fk(s), s). By Lemma 4.13(2), G
a
k(Fk(s), s)Fk(s), hence g
a
k(s)Fk(s).
Next, we show that Fk(s)gak(s). Suppose v is an i-child of Fk(s). Then there
exists a trace r with sri r and v=obji (Fk&1(r)). We show by induction on the
length of r that v is an i-child of gak(s). For the basis, suppose that r=s$, where s$
is an initial state with Oi (s$)=Oi (s)=o. By the (outer) induction hypothesis,
Fk&1(s$)= gak&1(s$), so v is an i-child of fk(s). Since Oi (root(v))=Oi (s$)=o, it
follows by means of the first clause of the definition of Jk, i, o that v is an i-child of
Gak( fk(s), s)= g
a
k(s). This establishes the basis. For the inductive step, we need to
show that if r$s$ is a trace with Oi (s$)=Oi (s) and obji (Fk&1(r$)) is an i-child of
Gak( fk(s), s) then obji (Fk&1(r$s$)) is an i-child of G
a
k( fk(s), s). This is immediate from
Lemma 4.12(2). K
Combining Corollary 4.9, Lemma 4.14, Proposition 4.11, and Proposition 2.1,
we obtain the following results, analogous to Theorem 4.7 and Corollary 4.8,
respectively.
Theorem 4.15. In every finite state environment E there exists
1. a finite state implementation in Ea of model checking the set of formulae 8k
of alternation depth at most k over traces, and
2. a finite state implementation in Ea of model checking the set of formulae in
8k of the form Ki. over observations of agent i.
In both cases, for formulae . of alternation depth k or less, (Ea, r) < . is decided
in time O(Ck } ( |r|+|.| )).
Proof. The automata A=(Q, q0 , +, ?) are similar to those for the synchronous
case. For external model checking, take Q=Tk _ [q0], where q0 is some new object
that will serve as the initial state of the automaton. The update function
+ : Q_S  Q is given by +(w, s)= gak(s) when w=q0 and +(w, s)=G
a
k(w, s)
otherwise. The function ? is given by ?(w, .)=true if and only if w < ..
In the agent-centric case, take Q=Fk&1, i _ [q0], where q0 is some new object
that will serve as the initial state of the automaton. The update function
+ : Q_O  Q is given by +(U, o)=[obji (Fk&1(s)) | s # I and Oi (s)=o] when w=q0
and +(U, o)=H ak&1, i (U, o) otherwise. The function ? is given by ?(U, Ki.)=true
if and only if w Vi U < . for all w # U.
For the complexity bound, we argue as follows. Write time( f ) for the time
required to compute the value of the function f. Note that time(H ak, i)=
O( |S | } Ck } time(Gak)), since computing H
a
k, i (U ) involves computing G
a
k(w, s)
for up to Ck k-trees w and |S | states s. Hence time(Gak)=O(n } time(H
a
k&1, i))=
O(n } |S | } Ck&1 } time(Gak&1)). It follows that time(G
a
k)=O(Ck). K
Corollary 4.16. Let . be a fixed formula of Ln and let E be a fixed environ-
ment. Then the set [r # traces(E ) | (E a, r) < .] is regular.
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In particular, we see from Theorem 4.15 that model checking formulae in Ln in
the structure M aE is in fact decidable.
5. COMMON KNOWLEDGE
The results of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 show that for both the synchronous and
asynchronous semantics, there exist finite state implementations of model checking,
provided formulae do not involve the common knowledge operator. In particular,
the set of traces satisfying a given formula of this kind is in both cases regular
(Corollary 4.8 and Corollary 4.16), hence linear time decidable. Does the same hold
for formulae involving common knowledge? Unfortunately, it does not, in a very
strong sense. In this section we establish lower bounds for model checking common
knowledge formulae. These bounds strongly suggest that, in general, no efficient
incremental approach, nor indeed any polynomial time algorithm, exists for
such formulae. This negative result is obtained for both the synchronous and
asynchronous semantics. However, whereas formulae in Ln are essentially of the
same order of complexity with respect to these two semantics, common knowledge
formulae turn out to be considerably more complex in the asynchronous case. We
begin with the synchronous semantics.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an environment E for two agents and a propositional
constant p such that the set [r # traces(E ) | (E, r) < C[1, 2] p] is PSPACE hard
(under LOGSPACE reductions).
Note that this lower bound is tight, by Proposition 3.1. It follows from
Theorem 5.1 that the set of traces corresponding to a common knowledge formula
is generally not regular (else PSPACE equals LOGSPACE, which is known to be
false). Thus Corollary 4.8 does not generalize to common knowledge formulae.
Moreover, it is very unlikely that even a polynomial time algorithm exists for model
checking such formulae, for this would imply that PSPACE is equal to PTIME.
We will prove Theorem 5.1 by showing how to encode space bounded deter-
ministic Turing machine computations. Consider the even numbered traces in the
sequence of traces of Example 2.4. The symbol b in these traces moves progressively
from left to right, much like the head of a Turing machine. Our hardness proof
will exploit this resemblance: traces will correspond to configurations of a Turing
machine, and a single step through the derivation relation of this machine will
correspond to taking two steps in the Kripke structure, first to an intermediate con-
figuration through the relation t1 and then through the relation t2 .
Let M be a Turing machine solving a PSPACE complete problem, with tape
symbols 7 and states Q. We take M to consist of a set of quintuples (s, q, s$, d, q$) ,
representing that if the head is scanning a cell containing symbol s # 7 while the
machine is in state q # Q, then in the next step of the computation the machine
writes symbol s$ # 7 in the current location, moves the head in direction d, which
is either L or R, (representing left or right, respectively) and assumes the new state
q$ # Q. We assume without loss of generality that M moves the head to the right
hand side of the allotted space before halting, and halts only when it accepts. We
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also assume that 7 contains the blank symbol and a special set of end of tape sym-
bols used by M to ensure that the head does not move out of the allotted space
during any computation. However, it is convenient to introduce two additional
markers, =l and =r , representing positions to the left and right of the ends of the
tape, which the head may never occupy. A configuration of the machine may be
represented as a string c of the form
=l s1s2 } } } sk(sk+1 , q) sk+2 } } } sn=r .
For i=1 } } } n the symbol si # 7 represents the contents of the i th cell of the tape.
The pair (sk+1, q) # 7_Q represents that the machine is scanning cell k+1 of the
tape and is in state q. If c$ is the configuration reached in one step from the con-
figuration c, and these configurations have the same length, then we write c O c$.
We write c O* c$ for the transitive closure of this relation. It is convenient to define
2L to be the set of pairs (s, q) such that M contains a quintuple of the form
(s, q, t, L, q$) . Intuitively, 2L encodes the situations in which the head moves to
the left. Similarly, we define 2R (representing cases in which the machine moves to
the right) to be the set of pairs (s, q) such that M contains a quintuple
(s, q, t, R, q$) .
We now describe the environment E=(S, I, T, O1 , ..., On , V ) used to encode
the Turing machine. This environment will have a set S of states consisting of the
markers =l and =r , all symbols in 7, all pairs in 7_Q, a special state V, as well as
1. for each h # 2L and s # 7, states Ls, h and Hs, h , and
2. for each h # 2R and s # 7, states Hh, s and Rh, s .
The symbols Ls, h , Hs, h , Hh, s and Rs, h will play the role of special markers in the
traces intermediate between configurations. Their precise meaning will be explained
below. The set of initial states will be I=[=l]. We take Prop to consist of the single
propositional constant p, which holds only at the state =r . For the transition rela-
tion T, it is convenient to write s  t instead of sTt. The set of transitions of E will
consist of the following:
1. s  s$, for each s, s$ # 7,
2. s  h and h  s for each s # 7 and h # 7_Q,
3. s  Ls$, h  Hs$, h  s" for all s, s$, s" # 7 and h # 2L ,
4. s  Hh, s$  Rh, s$  s" for all s, s$, s" # 7 and h # 2R ,
5. =l  s and =l  h and =l  Hh, s and =l  Ls, h$ for all s # 7, h # 2R and
h$ # 2L ,
6. s  =r and h  =r and Rh, s  =r and Hs, h$  =r for all s # 7, h # 2R and
h$ # 2L ,
7. (s, q)  V, where q is the final state of M.
In particular, we note that each configuration c of the form described above is a
trace of E. There exist other traces of E, but we will be primarily interested in the
traces which correspond to configurations, and in another set of traces to be intro-
duced shortly.
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We now specify the observation functions of the environment. Since the actual
values taken by these functions are of no interest, it suffices to list the equivalence
classes of the equivalence relations Ri defined by sRit when Oi (s)=Oi (t). We will
write [s] i for the equivalence class of Ri containing state s. If s # 7 and h # 7_Q
then
[s]1=[s] _ [Ls, h | h # 2L] _ [Rh, s | h # 2R]
[h]1=[h] _ [Hs, h | s # 7] _ [Hh, s | s # 7].
The only other non-trivial equivalence class of R1 is [=r , V]. Next, if s$ # 7 then
[s$]2=[s$] _ [Ht, (s, q) | (s, q, s$, L, q$) # M, t # 7]
_ [H(s, q), t | (s, q, s$, R, q$) # M, t # 7]
and if (t, q$) # 7_Q then
[(t, q$)]2=[(t, q$)] _ [Lt, (s, q) | (s, q, s$, L, q$) # M, t # 7]
_ [R(s, q) , t | (s, q, s$, R, q$) # M, t # 7].
All other equivalence classes of R2 are singletons. Note that for distinct s, s$ # 7
and distinct h, h$ # 7_Q, we have for each agent i=1, 2 that [s]i & [s$] i=<,
[s] i & [h] i=< and [h] i & [h$] i=<, so the sets described above do indeed
partition the state space into disjoint classes. This completes the description of the
environment.
We now introduce a class of traces that will play the role of intermediate points
in the simulation of O as t1 followed by t2 . If r==l s1s2 } } } sk(sk+1 , q)
sk+2 } } } sn =r is a configuration, then define the sequence r^ by
r^==l s1s2 } } } sk&1Lsk , (sk+1, q) Hsk , (sk+1, q) sk+2 } } } sn =r
when (sk+1, q) # 2L , and
r^==l s1s2 } } } skH(sk+1 , q) , sk+2 R(sk+1 , q), sk+2 sk+3 } } } sn =r
when (sk+1, q) # 2R . In both cases the sequence r^ is a trace of E. In the first case,
note that the information that the k th tape cell will contain the head in the con-
figuration to follow r is not locally available from the symbol sk occupying that cell.
Intuitively, the role of the symbol Lsk , (sk+1, q) is to make this information locally
available. Indeed, note that the next contents of the k th cell may be directly com-
puted from the symbol Lsk , (sk+1 , q) . Intuitively, the symbol Hsk , (sk+1 , q) encodes
information about the cell currently occupied by the head, together with the con-
tents of the cell to the left to which the head will move next. Again, this information
suffices to compute the next contents of this cell. The intuitive meaning of the sym-
bols H(sk+1 , q) , sk+2 and R(sk+1 , q), sk+2 is analogous. The next two lemmas formalize
these intuitions.
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Lemma 5.2. If r is a configuration in which the Turing machine state is not final,
then there exist precisely two traces r$ with rt1 r$, namely r itself and r^. If r is a final
(accepting) configuration then rt1 r$ for some trace r$ with final state V.
Proof. We consider just the case that the Turing machine state q is not the final
accepting state: the remainder of the result requires only a trivial verification. Let
r==l s1s2 } } } sk(sk+1 , q) sk+2 } } } sn=r and suppose rt1 r$=x0x1 } } } xn+1, where
each xi is in S. Suppose that xyz are any three consecutive states in r not containing
the head symbol (sk+1, q) and that x$y$z$ is a sequence of states with xyzt1 x$y$z$.
Note that state y must be a tape symbol in 7. By definition of the transition
relation, if y$=Lh, y for some h # 7_Q then necessarily z$=Hh, y . But since z is
either =r or in 7, we cannot then have zR1 z$, so this is a contradiction. It follows
that y$ is not of the form Lh, y . A similar argument shows that y$ is not of the form
Ry, h . The only other state in [ y]1 is y itself, so we obtain that y$= y. Since this
argument applies to any substring of r of length three, (and clearly x0==l and
xn+1==r) we see that r$ is equal to r, except for possibly the three positions
xk , xk+1 , and xk+2 .
Suppose that (sk+1, q) # 2L . Now if xk+1=Hy, (sk+1, q) for some y, then it
follows from the definition of T and R1 that y=sk and xk=Lsk , (sk+1, q) . Further,
we must have xk+1 # 7 _ [=r]. It follows that xk+1 is identical to the k+1-th
element of r, and consequently r$= r^. By symmetry, we also obtain r$=r^ when
(sk+1, q) # 2R . Finally, if xk+1=sk+1 then straightforward considerations show
r$=r. K
Lemma 5.3. If r is a configuration, then rt2 r$ if and only if r$=r or r$=c^ for
some configuration c such that c O r
Proof. The implication from right to left is readily checked, so we prove just the
implication from left to right. Let r==l s1s2 } } } sk(sk+1 , q) sk+2 } } } sn=r and suppose
rt2 r$=x0 x1 } } } xn+1. Arguments similar to those in Lemma 5.2 show that r$ is
identical to r except for possibly xk , xk+1 , and xk+2. Suppose first xk+1=
Lsk+1 , (s, q$) . Then by definition of T we must have xk # 7 _ [=l], hence xk is equal
to the k th element of r. In addition, we must have xk+2=Hsk+1, (s, q$) . Since
xk+2R2sk+2 , it follows that (s, q$, sk+2, L, q) # M. This shows that r$=c^ for a
configuration c such that c O r. A similar argument applies if xk+1=R(s, q$), sk+2 .
Finally, if xk+1=(sk+1 , q) then it is easy to show that r$=r. K
Putting together Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3, we see that if r0 is an initial con-
figuration containing sufficient tape cells for the computation of M and if
r0 O r1 O r2 O } } } O rn&1 O rn
is an initial segment of the computation of M, then we have
r0 t1 r^0 t2 r1 t1 r^1 t2 r2 t1 } } } t2 rn&1 t1 r^n&1 t2 rn .
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If rn is an accepting configuration, then we have in addition that rnt1 r for some
trace r with final state V, for which (E, r) < cp. It follows that if r0 describes an
initial configuration for an input on which M eventually accepts, as well as
sufficient space for the computation, then (E, r0) < cC[1, 2] p.
Suppose now that M does not accept (or halt) when started in configuration r0 .
We would like to show that (E, r0) < C[1, 2] p. This does not follow directly, since
the linear structure above does not completely describe the substructure of ME
generated by the trace r0 . For each ri+1 , there may exist configurations r other
than ri such that r O ri+1 , and hence rt1 r^t2 ri+1. By alternating the relations t1
and t2 , we may simulate the computation of M backward as well as forward, and
the backward steps need not be deterministic.3 However, the forward steps are
deterministic, so backward steps cannot take us to a configuration from which a
forward computation would halt. We see that r0t[1, 2] r if and only r=r1 or r=r^1
for some configuration r1 such that there exists a (non-halting) configuration r$
with r0 O* r$ and r1 O* r$. Since the final state of any trace r1 of the form
of a configuration is =r , as is the final state of r^1 , we have (E, r) < p for all such
traces r. Thus, we obtain (E, r0) < C[1, 2] p. This shows that (E, r0) < C[1, 2] p if
and only if the computation of M from the initial configuration r0 does not halt and
completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
We remark that this proof is closely related to tiling problems (Lewis, 1979),
finite versions of which have been studied as an alternative foundation for the
theory of computational complexity (Lewis and Papadimitriou, 1981; Chlebus,
1986; Gradel, 1990). A tiling problem corresponding to PSPACE may be
formulated as follows (Gradel, 1990). An instance of the problem consists of a finite
set D of dominoes and two binary relations H, V on D, together with a number n
determining an infinite lattice L=[0 } } } n]_[0, 1, 2, ...]. The problem is to decide
the existence of a tiling of L by D, that is, a mapping { : L  D such that for all
(x, y) # L, {(x, y) H{(x+1, y) and {(x, y) V{(x, y+1), provided these values are
defined. Here the horizontal relation H may be thought of as corresponding to our
transition relation T, and the vertical relation V may be thought of as corresponding
to our ti . The principal difference between tiling and the reachability problem for
common knowledge is that we restrict to vertical relations which are equivalence
relations: this difference accounts for the extra complexity in our proof.
We now turn to a lower bound for common knowledge formulae in the
asynchronous interpretation of environments. We first note that the asynchronous
semantics is able to simulate the synchronous semantics by means of a
straightforward construction. In order to turn an asynchronous system into a
synchronous system, all we need to do is add a clock, visible to all agents. Because
we assume perfect recall, this clock need not have an infinite number of states: two
alternating states suffice.
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To make this precise in our framework, let E=(S, I, T, O1 , ..., On , V ) be an
environment. Define the doubled environment
D(E)=(S$, I$, T $, O$1 , ..., O$n , V$)
as follows. We take the states S$ to be the set S_[0, 1]. We will write these
states in the format s } j where s # S and j # [0, 1]. Intuitively, s is the state of the
environment and j is the state of the clock. The valuation V$ is defined by
V$(s } j, p)=V(s, p). The transitions T $ will be precisely those of T, but with the
requirement that the clock state changes at each step, i.e.,
T $=[(s } j, t } k) | (s, t) # T, j, k # [0, 1] and j{k].
The observation functions of E$ are defined precisely as in E, but we make the clock
visible to all agents: for each agent i we let Oi$(s } j)=Oi (s) } j. In terms of the corre-
sponding equivalence relations Ri$ on states, we have (s } j) Ri$(s$ } j $) just when sRis$
and j= j $. Finally, we take the initial states I$ to consist of all states s } 1 where s # I.
With these definitions, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the
traces of E and the traces of D(E ). This correspondence is established by the doubling
function d, which maps a trace s1 } } } sn of E to the trace s1 } 1, s2 } 0, s3 } 1,
s4 } 0, ..., sn } (n mod 2) of D(E ). Clearly, this function preserves the valuation.
Furthermore, for all traces r, r$ of E, we have d(r)ri d(r$) if and only if rti r$. This
is because each agent is able to detect every state transition in D(E). Thus, even
under the asynchronous interpretation, D(E ) behaves like a synchronous environ-
ment, and we have the following result.
Proposition 5.4. For every environment E, the asynchronous Kripke structure
MaD(E ) is isomorphic to the synchronous Kripke structure ME .
This result implies that the asynchronous interpretation of environments makes
knowledge formulae at least as complex as the synchronous interpretation, so by
Theorem 5.1 we cannot expect to generalize the results of Section 4.3 to common
knowledge formulae. In fact, the asynchronous interpretation is much more
complex than this argument suggests, as the following result shows.
Theorem 5.5. There exists an environment F for two agents and a propositional
constant p such that it is undecidable, given a trace r, to determine if (F a, r) < C[1, 2] p.
Proof. By reduction from the Halting problem for Turing machines. Let M be
a universal Turing Machine. We construct an environment F which implements M
in such a way that whenever x is an input of the machine M, there exists a trace
r(x) such that (F a, r(x)) < C[1, 2] p if and only if M halts on input x. Intuitively, the
simulation works in two parts. First, exploiting the fact that asynchrony may make
a trace indistinguishable from arbitrarily long traces, we guess the amount of space
required for the simulation of M on x. Next, we use a synchronous environment to
perform the computation of M on x, restricted to the amount of space guessed in
the first part. This is achieved by means of the doubled environment D(E ), where
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E is an environment simulating M under the synchronous semantics. Note that we
no longer assume that M is space bounded, but we do assume M requires new tape
cells only to the right; i.e., M never tries to move to the left of the first cell in a con-
figuration. We also assume that M never writes the blank symbol, so that all con-
figurations consist of a sequence of non-blank symbols followed by some number
of blanks.
Formally, the environment F is constructed as follows. We write 1 for the union
of the set 7"[;] with the set 7_Q, where 7 is the set of tape symbols of M, Q
is the set of states of M and ; is the blank tape symbol. Let E be the environment
for M described in the proof of Theorem 5.1. The states of the environment F will
consist of all states of the environment D(E ), together with a state a } j for each ele-
ment a of 1 _ [;, =l , =r] and j # [0, 1]. These additional states we will call bar states.
The valuation of the environment F makes the proposition p true at =r } j and =r } j
for j=0, 1, but false everywhere else.
We take the set of transitions of the environment F to consist of all the trans-
itions of the environment D(E ), plus the following:
1. =l } 1  a } 0 for each a # 1,
2. a } j  b } k for all a, b # 1 and bits j{k,
3. a } j  ; } k for all a # 1 and bits j=% k,
4. ; } j  ; } k for all bits j{k, and
5. ; } j  =r } k for all bits j{k.
If r=s1s2 } } } sm is a sequence of states of E, write r for the sequence s1 } } } sm . If _
is a string over 1 and k>0 is a natural number, then define the trace
r(_, k)=d(=l_ ; k =r).
When _ represents an instantaneous description of the machine M (i.e., a configura-
tion without the end markers =l , =r), we may interpret r(_, k) as a configuration
consisting of _, plus an allotment of k tape cells for the computation. Note that if
a trace contains a bar state, then all states in that trace are bar states. Thus, the
traces of F may be divided into two classes: the class of traces of the form d(r),
where r is a trace of D(E ), and the class of traces which are prefixes of r(_, k) for
some _ # 1* and k0.
Finally, we describe the observation functions of the environment F by listing
the equivalence classes of the corresponding relations Ri . We begin with the
equivalence classes of R1 . For each a # 1 _ [=l , =r] and j # [0, 1], the bar state a } j
will comprise a singleton equivalence class. The set [; } 0, ; } 1] also forms an R1
equivalence class. The remaining equivalence classes of R1 are exactly as in D(E),
i.e., s } j # [t } k]1 just when j=k and sR1t according to the description of R1 in the
proof of Theorem 5.1. To obtain the equivalence classes of the relation R2 in F, we
modify the equivalence classes of the environment D(E ) by adding a } j to [a } j]2
for each a # 1 _ [=l , =r , ;] and bit j. Note that this definition is coherent, because
each equivalence class of R2 in D(E) contains at most one state of the form s } j with
s # 1 _ [=l , =r , ;].
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Let us now see how these observation relations determine the asynchronous
indistinguishability relations on traces. First, noting that no equivalence class of R1
contains both a bar state and a state of D(E), we see that no trace of D(E ) is
r1 -equivalent to any trace consisting of bar states. In particular, we obtain the
following:
v If r1 is a trace of E then d(r1)r1 r iff r=d(r2) for some trace r2 of E with
r1t1 r2 with respect to the environment E. Thus, if r1 is a non-final configuration
of M, then by Lemma 5.2 the trace r2 is either r1 or r^1 . Additionally, if r1 is a final
configuration with the head in the rightmost tape cell, then we have d(r1)r1 d(r$)
for some r$ with final state V.
v For traces of F of the form r(_, k), where _ is a string over 1 and k>0, we
have r(_, k)r1 r iff r=r(_, l ) for some l>0.
Next, note that the equivalence relation R2 preserves the clock bit, hence r2 -equi-
valent traces are of the same length. Also, each equivalence class of R2 contains at
most one bar state, so no two distinct traces comprised of bar states are r2 -equi-
valent. Thus, to describe the relation r2 it suffices to consider traces of the form
d(r1) with r1 a trace of E. In case r1 is a configuration of M we find d(r1)r2 r if
and only if either (i) r=d(r2) for some trace r2 of E with r1t2 r2 or (ii)
r=d(r1)=r(_, k) for some _ and k. By Lemma 5.3, case (i) holds just in when
r2=r1 or r2= r^ for some configuration r such that r O r1 . (Recall that O refers to
the derivation relation of M restricted to configurations of the same length.)
Suppose the machine M eventually halts when started with instantaneous
description _, and the computation uses precisely k additional tape cells, halting at
the rightmost of these cells. Then there exists a sequence of configurations
r0 O r1 O r2 O } } } O rn&1 O rn ,
where d(r0)=r(_, k) and rn is a final configuration. By the considerations above we
obtain
d(r0)r1 d(r^0)r2 d(r1)r1 d( r^1)r2 d(r2)
r1 } } } r2 d(rn&1)r1 d(r^n&1)r2 d(rn).
Furthermore, r(_, 1)r1 r(_, k)r2 d(r0) and d(rn)r1 d(r) for some trace r of E with
final state V. Since (F, d(r)) < cp, this shows that if _ is an instantaneous descrip-
tion from which M eventually accepts, then (F a, r(_, 1)) < cC[1, 2] p.
Next, we need to show that if _ is an instantaneous description of M from which
the computation of M does not halt, then all traces [1, 2]-accessible from r(_, 1)
satisfy p. The situation here is like that in the proof of Theorem 5.1, where we noted
that backward steps in the derivation relation of M do not lead to configurations
with different termination properties. Things are complicated slightly by the fact
that the r[1, 2] access sequence may now contain steps of the form r({, k)r1 r({, l ),
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but all these do is add or delete blank cells, which cannot turn a configuration from
which M fails to halt into one from which M does eventually halt (given sufficient
space). Thus, if _ is an instantaneous description from which M does not halt, then
r(_, 1)r[0, 1] r1 implies that either r1=r({, k) for some { and k, r1=d(r), or
r1=d(r^) for some non-final configuration r. In every case the final state of r1 is of
the form =r } j or =r } j, and we have (F a, r1) < p. This establishes that if M does not
halt from instantaneous description _, then (F a, r(_, 1)) < C[1, 2] p. K
Somewhat related to the results of this section are a number of papers (Chandra
and Stockmeyer, 1976; Peterson and Reif, 1979; Reif, 1984; Reif and Peterson,
1980), which have studied the complexity of games of incomplete information and
develop applications to distributed processing. The framework of these papers is
related to ours, but the complexity results developed are different because they deal
with the problem of determining the existence of a winning strategy, rather than the
problem of computing players’ knowledge.
6. KNOWLEDGE-BASED PROGRAMS
In a number of papers (Dwork and Moses, 1990; Hadzilacos, 1987; Halpern and
Moses, 1990; Halpern and Zuck, 1992; Mazer, 1988) it has been shown that
knowledge formulae may provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
achievement of a variety of coordination tasks. This enables the formulation of
knowledge-based programs (Halpern and Fagin, 1989; Fagin et al., 1995a; Fagin et
al., 1995b) for these tasks, in which knowledge formulae are used as preconditions
for actions. Knowledge-based programs have been shown to provide perspicuous
descriptions of standard protocols and to elucidate the common ideas underlying
apparently different protocols.
Given a precise description of the environment in which a knowledge-based
program runs, e.g., a specification of the assumptions concerning message delivery
and loss, a knowledge-based program may be implemented by a standard protocol,
obtained by replacing the knowledge preconditions by appropriate standard com-
putations based on the state of the processor. The determination of these standard
computations has so far been carried out on a case by case basis. For example,
(Dwork and Moses, 1990; Moses and Tuttle, 1988) established that in protocols
solving a distributed agreement problem in the presence of processor failures, the
truth of a particular formula asserting a type of common knowledge of a group of
agents is a necessary and sufficient condition for agreement. It is shown how a test
for the truth of this formula may be implemented, given a variety of assumptions
on the nature of failures. For crash and sending omission failures it turns out that
the test may be implemented in time polynomial in the number of processors (this
number also bounds the length of the relevant traces). However, for general omis-
sion failures, the test is shown to be NP hard, with an upper bound of PSPACE.
This type of analysis has shown the appropriateness of knowledge as a level of
abstraction for the design of distributed systems. Consequently, the possibility of
high level programming languages with explicit operators for knowledge is a
current topic of investigation (Moses and Kislev, 1993; Fagin et al., 1995a; Fagin
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et al., 1995b). In order to permit the execution of knowledge-based programs, such
a language would have to support the compilation of knowledge formulae into
standard functions of the state of the processor.
Our work in this paper may be viewed as an initial foray into the feasibility of
automating this kind of compilation when knowledge is interpreted with respect to
a perfect recall semantics. Of particular interest in this regard are the results con-
cerning evaluation of fixed sets of formula in traces of increasing length, which is
closely related to the type of operation required in knowledge-based programs. It
is encouraging that model checking of fixed knowledge formulae may be implemented
using finite state automata. In subsequent work (Meyden, 1996a), we have shown
that the results of Section 4 may be applied to automate the verification of
implementations of knowledge-based programs with respect to the perfect recall
semantics. (Results of (Vardi, 1996) concern the verification of implementations of
knowledge-based programs under a more restricted semantics for knowledge.)
However, our results fall short of enabling an automated procedure for compila-
tion of even the simplest type of knowledge-based program. In knowledge-based
programs, the set of successors of a given state of the environment depends not just
on information local to that state, but also on the knowledge of the agents, since
knowledge may constrain action. This means that the set of traces of a knowledge-
based program is generally smaller than the set of traces generated by the underlying
transition system obtained from the agents’ possible actions. Since the knowledge-
based program being run is assumed to be common knowledge, this in turn influences
the agents’ knowledge. The model of the present paper is unable to represent this
interdependence of knowledge and action. We consider a generalization of the
framework of the present paper that explicitly models knowledge-based programs
in (Meyden, 1996b; Meyden, 1996a; Meyden, 1997).
Another limitation of our formulation is its finite state nature. The specification
of even such simple protocols as the Alternating Bit Protocol requires an infinite
input stream, hence an infinite state space. Some of the examples in the knowledge
literature also use full-information protocols (Moses and Tuttle, 1988; Dwork and
Moses, 1990), in which agents send messages containing their entire history. In
general, these works deal only with traces of a finitely bounded length, so this could
be modelled using finite state environments. However, it would be interesting to
study full information protocols with arbitrarily long traces, which would require a
more expressive framework. Nevertheless, given the simplicity of our framework,
the results of this paper would seem to provide lower bounds applicable to more
general frameworks.
In this respect the high complexity we have found for model checking common
knowledge formulae is somewhat disappointing. Common knowledge is known to
be a prerequisite for simultaneous action, and variants of common knowledge have
been found to play a central role in many other types of coordination (Halpern and
Moses, 1990; Panangaden and Taylor, 1992). Thus, model checking of common
knowledge formulae is likely to be a crucial requirement for some applications of
knowledge-based programming. The PSPACE hardness of common knowledge
formulae in synchronous environments shows that one cannot always expect to find
efficient implementations for programs involving tests for common knowledge. In
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the asynchronous case the situation is worse: here the undecidability result shows
that compilation into even a terminating program is in general impossible.
However, some caution is required in interpreting these results. Note that the
lower bound results state that there exist environments in which common
knowledge formulae are hard, not that these formulae are hard in all environments.
The environments constructed in the proofs of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.5 are
very unnatural. Although limited, the class of environments studied in this paper is
in some respects too broad. It is not clear to what extent the hardness results will
persist in more reasonable classes of environments. We have shown recently that in
environments in which all communication is by synchronous broadcast, model
checking of even common knowledge formulae is tractable (Meyden, 1996a;
Meyden, 1997), and knowledge-based programs in such environments have finite
state implementations. Another class of environments worth investigating is the
class of asynchronous message passing systems, in which common knowledge is
known to be constant, and various weakenings of common knowledge suffice for
the coordination tasks of interest.
Related to knowledge-based programming formalisms is the work of Rosenschein
and Kaelbling, which deals with the verification of externally ascribed knowledge
properties of situated machines (Rosenschein, 1985; Rosenschein and Kaelbling,
1986). However, while the language of (Rosenschein and Kaelbling, 1986) permits
the decomposition of a machine into a number of components, each of which is
treated as an agent, the focus is on agents’ knowledge of the world rather than
nestings of knowledge operators.
Another strand of work on knowledge-based programming languages is
Shoham’s proposal to develop Agent Oriented Programming Languages (Shoham,
1993). These are a specialization of message passing formulations of object oriented
programming, in which objects take the form of agents, which have a variety of
mental states, including beliefs and commitments. These mental states are revised as
messages are sent and received. However, instead of the external ascription of
knowledge we have studied in the present paper, belief in Shoham’s model is inter-
nally ascribed: an agent believes just what is recorded in its database. Furthermore,
an update in Shoham’s framework does not make use of any semantic knowledge,
and default assumptions are applied: an agent maintains its beliefs about the world,
and its beliefs about other agents beliefs, until it learns contradictory information
(Isozaki and Shoham, 1992). We note that in our model no such persistence is
assumed: indeed, in the synchronous case, an agents’ knowledge may change with
each tick of the clock, since it must be true in a non-deterministically changing
world.
7. CONCLUSION
We have presented in this paper a model-theoretic approach to computing
knowledge in finite environments. An alternate approach would be to formalize an
environment as a theory in a logic with modal operators for knowledge and time,
and then perform deduction in this logic. Complete axiomatizations of logics of
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knowledge and time in systems with perfect recall are known in both the syn-
chronous case (Halpern and Vardi, 1986; Halpern and Vardi, 1988a) and the
asynchronous case (Meyden, 1994). However, these results are for languages not
containing common knowledge operators. For both synchronous and asynchronous
systems, adding common knowledge to these logics makes the validity problem
6 11 -complete (Halpern and Vardi, 1989), which implies that there can be no com-
plete axiomatization. This precludes the direct application of logics of knowledge
and time to our problems, since it is necessary to express that the environment is
common knowledge to all agents. On the other hand, the results of this paper
suggest that appropriate decidable and axiomatizable fragments of logics with com-
mon knowledge and time may exist, but this requires further work.
While the algorithms we developed in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 are theoreti-
cally linear time, in many cases they will not be directly practicable, because the
state spaces of most systems of interest are too large to be explicitly represented.
However, recent work on model checking in temporal logic (Valmari, 1990; Burch
et al., 1990; Emerson and Sistla, 1993) is beginning to provide ways to deal with
the state space explosion problem, and we expect that the techniques developed in
this area can be generalized to knowledge formulae. We leave this for future work.
Finally, we remark that the two semantic ascriptions of knowledge we have
studied in this paper are not the only ones possible. One reasonable alternative is
to drop the perfect recall assumption and ascribe knowledge to an agent based on
its current observation only. As shown in (Fisher and Immerman, 1986), in systems
of this form common knowledge formulae may be reduced to knowledge formulae.
APPENDIX: AN INTERPRETED SYSTEM SEMANTICS
The semantics of knowledge in environments defined in this paper has been
chosen to provide a parsimonious treatment of the particular problems we consider.
It is possible to give a slightly more general definition of the semantics in terms of
the interpreted systems of (Fagin et al., 1995b). We sketch this alternative semantics
here and show that it is essentially equivalent to ours. For brevity, we assume
familiarity with the approach of (Fagin et al., 1995b).
Suppose that E=(S, I, T, O1 , ..., On) is an environment with observations O.
The definitions to follow make the most sense under the assumption that the trans-
ition relation T is serial, i.e., for each state s # S there exists a state t # S with sTt.
In most applications this assumption can be guaranteed by adding one or more
new states representing that the system has terminated.
The framework of (Fagin et al., 1995b) is based on runs, which are functions \
mapping the natural numbers to tuples in Le_L1_..._Ln , where Le is a set of
states of the environment, and for each i=1 } } } m, Li is a set of local states of agent
i. We take Le=S, and each Li=O*, the set of finite sequences of observations.
Define an infinite trace { of an environment E to be an infinite sequence
(s0 , s1 , ...) of states of E such that s0 # I and smTsm+1 for all m0. Each infinite
trace gives rise to two runs, depending on whether we take the synchronous or
asynchronous interpretation. In either case, we have \e(m)=sm . In the synchronous
case we define the local states of agent i by \i (m)=[s0 } } } sm]i , the (synchronous)
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local state of agent i in the trace consisting of the finite prefix of { of length m+1.
Define R to be the set of runs so obtained from all infinite traces of E. Similarly,
in the asynchronous case we may define the local states of agent i by \i (m)=
[s0 } } } sm]ai , using the asynchronous local state assignment from Section 2, and take
Ra to be the set of runs obtained using this definition from all infinite traces of E.
A point is a pair (\, m) consisting of a run \ and a number m0. When the
environment states Le in runs are states of the environment E, an interpretation
function ? mapping points to valuations on the set of basic propositions may be
defined by ?(\, m)( p)=V(\e(m), p).
With these definitions, we obtain the two interpreted systems I=(R, ?) and
Ia=(Ra, ?). We may interpret formulae of LCn at points in these systems in the
usual way, following the definitions of (Fagin et al., 1995b). The following result
shows that that these interpretations correspond closely to the semantics of
Section 2.
Proposition A.1. Let E be an environment with serial transition relation T. Given
an infinite trace { and number m0, let r be the finite trace of E consisting of the
first m+1 states of {. Then for all formulae . # LCn we have the following.
1. If \ is the run obtained from { according to the synchronous interpretation,
then (E, r) < . if and only if I, (\, m) < ..
2. If \$ is the run obtained from { according to the asynchronous interpretation,
then (Ea, r) < . if and only if Ia, (\$, m) < ..
Proof. Straightforward induction on the complexity of .. K
In effect, this result states that the language LCn is too weak to distinguish runs
having the same history r up to the point (\, m). This justifies basing the study of
model checking on the finite objects r rather than the infinite objects (\, m).
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